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In cryptographic processor design, the selection of functional primitives
and connection structures between these primitives are extremely crucial to
maximize throughput and flexibility. Hence, detailed analysis on the speci-
fications and requirements of existing crypto-systems plays a crucial role in
cryptographic processor design. This thesis provides the most comprehensive
literature review that we are aware of on the widest range of existing cryp-
tographic algorithms, their specifications, requirements, and hardware struc-
tures. In the light of this analysis, it also describes a high performance, low
power, and highly flexible cryptographic processor, Cryptoraptor, that is de-
signed to support both today’s and tomorrow’s encryption standards. To the
best of our knowledge, the proposed cryptographic processor supports the
widest range of cryptographic algorithms compared to other solutions in the
literature and is the only crypto-specific processor targeting the future stan-
dards as well. Unlike previous work, we aim for maximum throughput for all
vi
known encryption standards, and to support future standards as well. Our
1GHz design achieves a peak throughput of 128Gbps for AES-128 which is
competitive with ASIC designs and has 25X and 160X higher throughput per
area than CPU and GPU solutions, respectively.
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
1.1 Introduction
As the demand for secure communication bandwidth is growing at an
unprecedented pace, efficient and high throughput cryptographic processing
becomes increasingly critical for overall system performance. Besides high
performance computing, the flexibility also becomes an essential feature of
cryptographic processors because of the numerous cryptographic algorithms
and security standards. New cryptographic algorithms are continuously being
developed, which makes existing hardware inadequate to satisfy new require-
ments. Thus, it becomes more desirable for cryptographic processors to sup-
port existing crypto-systems as well as having the potential to support future
standards.
To be to cover all cryptography domain, one must understand the whole
domain and existing requirements first. In current cryptography standards,
there are three types of algorithms: (i) symmetric-key encryption and (ii)
cryptographic hash functions, and (iii) public-key encryption.
a. Symmetric-key encryption: Symmetric-key encryption refers to a class
of cryptography algorithms where a sequence of operations is repeatedly
1
applied to the blocks of data using a single shared key to encrypt and de-
crypt. Since both parties have to share and use a single "secret" or "key"
for encryption and decryption, symmetric-key encryption is also known
as "shared key encryption" or "private key encryption". Symmetric-key
encryption algorithms exist as block and stream ciphers. While block
ciphers tend to be used for higher security, stream ciphers are known to
be fast, secure enough, easier to implement, and requires less processing
power. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [58], and Rivest Cipher 4
(RC4) [213] are often used examples of this algorithm class.
b. Cryptographic hash functions: Cryptographic hash functions refer to
a class of irreversible one-way functions that take an arbitrary length
message and generate a fixed-size bit sequence, message digest. Cryp-
tographic hash functions are widely used in the form of authentication
such as digital signatures and message authentication codes. Secure Hash
Algorithm-1 (SHA1) [74] and Secure Hash Algorithm-2 (SHA2) [74] are
widely used examples of this class.
c. Public-key encryption: Public-key encryption is a class of cryptography
algorithms that requires a pair of keys; one public and one private for
each user. The private key is always in the possession of the owner,
while public key is sent along with the message or publicly available.
Even though the public and private keys are entirely different, they are
mathematically linked to each other as specified in the algorithm. Since
2
the keys are used for performing opposite operations, public-key encryp-
tion is also known as "asymmetric cryptography". The security of a
public key encryption depends on the computational infeasibility of the
algorithm which generally involves (i) computing the factors of a gigan-
tic number (300 decimal digits or more) that is the product of two large
prime numbers or (ii) exponentiation of a significantly large number over
a significantly large another number in modulo p where p is a large prime.
The widely known public-key encryption algorithms are Diffie-Hellman
key exchange [98] and RSA [112].
While symmetric-key encryption algorithms and hash functions mostly
rely on primitive logical and arithmetic operations that can be computed ef-
ficiently, modular exponentiation and modular multiplication are the most
frequent operations in public-key encryption. Public-key encryption tends to
be very slow and resource intensive. They require special hardware support for
high performance since they have to deal with very large numbers (up to 2048
bits). Public-key encryption algorithms are relatively computationally expen-
sive compared to the most, if not all, symmetric-key encryption algorithms
and cryptographic hash functions; therefore, they are expensive in terms of
time, area, and power.
In this project, our studies and the proposed cryptographic processor fo-
cus on symmetric-key encryption algorithms and cryptographic hash functions
only since they rely on common structures and completely different computa-
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tional primitives than public-key cryptography. Thus, public-key encryption
is currently beyond the scope of this work.
1.2 Our Contributions
New cryptography standards and fast implementation of existing ones
are continuously being developed. Implementations are ranging from application-
specific integrated circuits (ASICs), which are fast but inflexible, to general
purpose processor (GPP) based software, which are flexible, but slow. In this
thesis, we address the problem of having highly flexible and yet high perfor-
mance cryptographic processor.
To design a high performance configurable crypto processor, one must
first understand which functionalities must be implemented by that proces-
sor in order to support current cryptographic algorithms while providing the
capability of implementing future algorithms as required.
Our first contribution is the comprehensive literature review on crypto-
graphic algorithms and the detailed analysis on the specifications and require-
ments of various crypto-systems. To the best of our knowledge, our algorithm
analysis of 148 existing symmetric-key encryption algorithms and hash func-
tions is the first and only work that provides comprehensive information about
the algorithms and hardware structures that can efficiently implement them.
During our study, we focused on the architectural structure of cryptographic
algorithms to bridge the gap between hardware designers and cryptographic
algorithm developers. Even though each algorithm has different structures
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and characteristics, we focused both on finding common patterns and charac-
teristics, as well as the features that differ between algorithms. Unlike other
research projects that focus on a limited set of currently popular algorithms,
our analysis relies on a wide range of cryptographic algorithms.
As the second and main contribution, we propose a high performance
and highly flexible cryptographic processor based on our analysis. It supports
a wide range of existing ciphers and cryptographic hash functions and has
high potential to support future algorithms. The proposed architecture with
its reconfigurable substrate provides a high degree of flexibility even when
implemented in an ASIC. Besides its flexibility, our design operating at 1GHz
achieves a peak throughput of 128Gbps on CTR AES-128 encryption which is
highly competitive with fully-optimized AES cores described in the literature.
Lastly, we provide a detailed timing, power, and area analysis on func-
tional primitives of cryptographic algorithms and our processor. We be-
lieve that such analysis combined with our comprehensive literature survey
on symmetric-key encryption algorithms and hash functions would help both
cryptographic algorithm developers and hardware designers to evaluate design
trade-offs during the design and implementation.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we briefly
describe related research projects and other solutions found in the literature.
The chapter 3 and 4 present our detailed analysis on existing cryptographic
5
algorithms. The specifications and design rationales of our proposed crypto-
graphic processor are given in chapter 5. In chapter 6, we provide detailed
analysis of our processor in terms of performance, timing, area, power, and
algorithm coverage. The chapter 7 provides brief description about a subset of
algorithms and explains how these algorithms are mapped onto our processor.
Finally, we discuss possible future research questions and extensions to the
proposed processor in chapter 8 and 9.
6
Chapter 2
Related Work
Once a cryptographic algorithm is designed, it is relatively straightfor-
ward to implement that algorithm in software to run on a general purpose
processor (GPP). Such an implementation, however, may not provide the de-
sired performance at the desired power and computing resources. For example,
encrypting 10Gb/s of data using an Intel processor with AES instructions to-
day takes roughly one processing core, which may not be acceptable.
To drastically reduce or eliminate the processing overhead from the
GPP, one could implement encryption algorithms in a hard-wired application-
specific integrated circuit (ASIC). Doing so potentially offers the highest per-
formance at the lowest power, but requires hardware design that is expensive
and the final product is inflexible. If the ASIC does not support any of the
currently used algorithms, it is worthless and would have to be replaced, at
potentially great cost and effort. Even if a subset of the algorithms supported
is not used, there is wasted silicon and the effort; therefore, the cost to build
and deploy that ASIC may not be worthwhile. Moreover, changing standards
and algorithms could make ASIC partially or entirely useless. Thus, the inflex-
ibility of ASIC solutions is a significant negative. To eliminate the inflexibility,
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one could implement encryption algorithms in hardware structures in a field
programmable gate array (FPGA) that can be reprogrammed at will. FP-
GAs, however, are expensive and, at least currently, roughly the same level of
difficulty to program as an ASIC (though much simpler to delay).
Another alternative is to design a special purpose programmable pro-
cessor that is optimized to execute cryptographic algorithms. Due to their
flexibility and high throughput, reconfigurable cryptographic processors are
promising alternatives for the implementation of cryptographic algorithms.
Therefore, developing a hardware architecture that provides efficient and high
throughput implementations for crypto-systems has become increasingly im-
portant.
2.1 Instruction Set Architecture Extensions
The first category that tries to achieve high throughput on crypto-
graphic applications is ISA extensions (ISEs) which are new instructions in-
troduced to support one or more cryptographic algorithms. Intel added six
SSE instructions and hardware support in their new generation CPUs to speed
up AES [4]. Even though the proposed pipeline and new instructions help to
achieve high performance by having the round latency of six cycles for one
stream in serial mode, they are useful to accelerate AES only. IBM and Or-
acle also introduced new cryptographic instructions and hardware support in
their high-end processors. IBM provided a crypto engine in IBM PowerENTM
Processor Chip [40] to accelerate a predefined set of crypto-systems: AES,
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ARC4, DES, Kasumi, MD5, SHA-1, and SHA-2. Likewise, Oracle followed
the same strategy in the Sparc T4 Chip [84] to support a similar set of al-
gorithms: AES, DES, Kasumi, Camellia, MD5, SHA-1, and SHA-2. Both
IBM and Oracle designs consist of algorithm-specific instructions and dedi-
cated hardware units for each algorithm, which restricts their flexibility and
prevents them from supporting other existing and future algorithms.
There are several research projects [25, 44, 67, 110, 129, 193, 221] that
propose new instruction extensions to existing ISAs or hardware extensions to
GPPs; however, they are also restricted. Even though Parallel Table Lookup
[76] and Parallel Read instructions [130] are not intended to be algorithm-
specific extensions, they are not useful for the algorithms that do not have
table lookup operations and not enough to implement the full functionality
of the algorithms that have table lookup operations. The ISE proposed by
Grabher [89] accelerates a wider range of cryptographic algorithms compared
to other ISE solutions. Nevertheless, it is also limited to a subset of crypto-
systems, specifically the ones that operate on data in a bit-oriented manner
rather than word-oriented.
Even though ISE proposals improve software performance of crypto-
graphic algorithms, most of the added functionalities is limited to speeding
up AES only or a limited subset of crypto-systems. However, more generic
crypto-specific ISEs are desirable to support a wide range of algorithms and
achieve higher throughput.
9
2.2 Algorithm Specific Hardware
In addition to ISE solutions introduced in literature and commercial
products, there are countless algorithm-specific hardware implementations for
both ASIC and FPGA intended to achieve high throughput and better area
and power efficiency.
Due to large development and manufacture cost of cell-based and full
custom hardware, ASIC solutions become less attractive then FPGA-based
solutions. FPGA-based designs also have a quicker time-to-market cycle than
ASICs. Therefore, FPGA generally seems to be the ideal candidate for recon-
figurable yet high-performance implementation of cryptography algorithms.
FPGA-based designs often operate efficiently when highly pipelined. Most
of the optimized hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms use
pipelined approaches with varying number of stages, where inner-round func-
tions are duplicated. Doing so allows to achieve a higher maximum frequency,
higher throughput, and more efficient use of hardware resources. There has
been significant amount of work done in the area of high performance imple-
mentation of crypto-systems, specifically for AES [5, 31, 49, 70, 86, 87, 99, 100,
102, 107, 109, 132, 139, 151, 171, 181, 186, 187, 204, 212, 228]. Optimized hard-
ware implementations have also been described for Camellia [60, 223], DES
[144], Twofish [124], Blowfish [70], RC4 [78], SHA-1 and SHA-2 [48].
Although hardware solutions optimized for particular algorithms do
not have the same objective as our work, they inspired us to design a more
optimized processor and helped us to map algorithms onto our processor more
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effectively rather than following the traditional structures as described in their
specifications.
2.3 Domain Independent Configurable Processors
Besides application and domain-specific reconfigurable computing so-
lutions, there also exists research projects [126, 170] on domain independent
configurable processors to lower design effort and eliminate hardware mod-
ifications when requirements change. The main purpose of such systems is
to enable efficient high performance computing. Despite the fact that flexi-
bility and ease of design are listed as the key benefits of these systems, the
applicability of the proposed techniques has not been evaluated on more than
one application or domain. The reconfigurability of such systems only allows
the processor to integrate different hardware accelerators or configure different
functional units in execute stage based on the input.
One serious drawback of the proposed techniques is that they rely on
traditional instruction fetch and decode structures to make control decisions,
which increases the complexity of hardware, requires more area, and consumes
the majority of total energy used in the whole processor (Figure 2.1). In an
in-order Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC), a large fraction of energy
dissipation can be attributed to the instruction supply; 37% for fetching, 18%
for decoding, and 14% for issuing an instruction [92]. With our processor
architecture, we aim to increase energy efficiency by simplifying the front-end
structure of a conventional processor. We use a compact finite state machine
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Figure 2.1: The distribution of energy dissipation in an in-order RISC proces-
sor [92]
representation for control flow of algorithms to reduce the energy consumption
and area requirements.
Our proposed architecture is not the first attempt to simplify the front
end of the system. BERET [92] is an energy efficient general purpose copro-
cessor that can be configured to benefit a wide range of applications. The pro-
posed approach maps users’ application to predefined sub-graphs and partially
eliminates "fetch-decode-issue" stages using trace cache for those sub-graphs.
Besides high power consumption and area requirements, generic recon-
figurable processors generally fail to achieve very high throughput due to the
lack of cryptographic algorithm-specific instructions, or they require recompi-
lation process to adapt their internal structures for a specific algorithm.
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To the best of our knowledge, ProDFA [224] is the only domain inde-
pendent runtime reconfigurable architecture that is evaluated on symmetric-
key encryption algorithms and does not rely on traditional "fetch-decode-issue"
structure. The proposed architecture consists of several reconfigurable process-
ing units, memory units, and interconnects. Each sub-unit is self-controlled
using a finite state machine. Even though overall architecture of ProDFA is
domain independent, the functional units need to be recompiled for different
application domains.
2.4 Configurable Cryptographic Processors
Even though there are various application-specific coprocessors and
algorithm-specific hardware implementations, there are very limited attempts
to build configurable cryptographic processors with generic modules suitable
for a large set of cryptographic algorithms.
CRYPTONITE [43], a Very Long Instruction Word (VLIW) architec-
ture, is a cryptographic processor that supports various encryption and hashing
standards, e.g. AES, DES, MD5, and SHA-1. The proposed processor is a two-
cluster architecture where each bank consists of a crypto-specific arithmetic
logic unit and dedicated memory structure with vector memory addressing
mode optimized for table-based encryption functions. Even though the pro-
posed vector memory addressing scheme provides flexibility on permutations
and table lookup operations, only per-byte or smaller granularity operations
are supported.
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CCProc [208] is a flexible cryptography co-processor for symmetric-key
encryptions. The proposed coprocessor has its own instruction set tailored to
symmetric-key encryption algorithms and an extended VLIW RISC-like data-
path structure. The design was aimed to support a wide range of symmetric-
key encryption algorithms, but only tested on AES round 2 finalists; Rijn-
dael(AES), MARS, RC6, Serpent, and Twofish. Support for other ciphers and
cryptographic hash functions has not been evaluated.
Multi-Core Crypto-Processor (MCCP) [90] is an FPGA-based reconfig-
urable and high throughput cryptographic processor to secure multi-channel
and multi-standard communication systems. It is designed as loosely coupled
multi-core system with its own crypto-specific ISA to provide a flexible and
high performance cryptography solution. However, the proposed structure is
designed to support only 128-bit block cipher algorithms. Thus, it fails to be
generic for both symmetric-key encryptions and cryptographic hash functions.
Celator [77] is another cryptographic coprocessor that supports multiple
block ciphers and cryptographic hash functions. The proposed architecture
consists of 4x4 identical processing elements, each of which can be configured
independently. A processing element is capable of performing XOR, AND,
NOT, modular arithmetic, right shift, and one AES-specific operation; xtime.
Even though proposed processor is designed for multi-algorithm support, it has
not been evaluated on algorithms other than AES, DES, SHA-1, and SHA-2,
and the processing element structure is not powerful enough to support a wide
range of algorithms efficiently.
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Zodiac [93] is a Network Security Processor designed to provide high
performance for network security protocols; IPsec and SSL. Even though it
seems to be an application-specific processor, its architecture allows to perform
different algorithms and applications; DES, 3DES, AES, RSA, ECC, SHA-1,
pseudo random number generation, IPsec, and SSL. Like other alternatives,
the main drawback of the proposed processor is that it is restricted to a prede-
fined set of cryptographic applications due to having dedicated hardware for
each algorithm.
Cryptographic (Optimized for Block Ciphers) Reconfigurable Archi-
tecture (COBRA) [66, 68] is a reconfigurable array structure for efficient block
cipher implementations. The proposed architecture is designed after a detailed
analysis of 41 block ciphers. However, the algorithm analysis is restricted to
block ciphers that operate on plaintext with block sizes of 64 and 128 bits.
Even though it aims to support wide range of block ciphers, it fails to effi-
ciently support some most commonly known algorithms (i.e DES and IDEA);
thus, it fails to be generic even for block ciphers. The main reasons of not
being able to generic are (i) limited block size support, (ii) insufficient lookup
table structure, (iii) insufficient bit-wise permutations, and (iv) fixed modulus
in modular arithmetic units. While bitwise shifts and rotations are possi-
ble on COBRA, bit-wise permutations are extremely difficult to implement.
The main difference between COBRA and other configurable cryptographic
processors is that the datapath needs to be recompiled for each algorithm sep-
arately, resulting different clock frequency and area usage for each algorithm.
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However, our project focuses on designing a cryptographic processor with fixed
hardware that can be reconfigurable for a wide range of existing cryptographic
processor.
Besides research projects, there exists one commercial processor in-
troduced by IBM, called IBM PCIe Cryptographic Coprocessor [103], which
provides a high-security and high throughput cryptographic subsystem with
specialized hardware to perform AES, DES, 3DES, RSA, SHA-1, and SHA-2.
The coprocessor consists of secured sub-system modules which are controlled
using sub-system control program and a cryptographic application program-
ming interface (API).
The advantages of alternative solutions described above include bet-
ter area, power and cost efficiencies, flexibility, algorithm upgradability, and
higher performance. However, existing reconfigurable crypto-processors are
still restricted to only a small set of symmetric-key encryption algorithms and
hash functions, and are far from being generic for all existing and potential
future algorithms. Moreover, the proposed solutions mostly rely on traditional
instruction fetch and decode structures to make control decisions, which po-
tentially results in high power and area consumptions.
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Chapter 3
Cryptographic Algorithm Analysis
In this chapter, we describe our algorithm selection process and anal-
ysis methodology, and provide a detailed analysis on existing symmetric-key
encryption algorithms and cryptographic hash functions.
3.1 Existing Workload Characterizations
Designing a flexible, high performance, and resource efficient solution
for cryptographic applications requires a comprehensive literature review on
existing symmetric-key encryption algorithms and hash functions. Besides
detailed information on existing algorithms, such study also gives an insight
about potential requirements and specifications of future cryptographic algo-
rithms.
Even though there are numerous attempts to speed up cryptographic
applications, there are only few studies [77, 206, 208, 224] that present analy-
sis on functional and hardware structure of existing cryptographic algorithms.
However, since they are only supportive parts of the presented work in these
papers, these analyses only focus on a small set of cryptographic algorithms
and only categorize the operation classes. Thus, they do not provide suffi-
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ciently detailed information about common hardware structures of existing
crypto-systems to enable the design of high performance configurable crypto
processor. On the other hand, there are some attempts [45, 47, 75] to study
workload characteristics of a set of cryptographic algorithms and profile their
software implementation. They give a good idea about the operations classes,
their usage frequencies, and required instructions. However, they are also
limited to a small set of algorithms, hence not sufficient enough to design a
highly configurable cryptographic processor. With its analysis on 41 block
ciphers, Elbirt [68] provides detailed information about their functional prim-
itives and common hardware elements so far. However, the algorithm analysis
is restricted to block ciphers that operate on plaintext with block sizes of 64
and 128 bits. Like other studies, it also does not present the relation between
functional primitives, common patterns, and connection structures. Hence, it
is far from providing a sufficiently detailed analysis.
To the best of our knowledge, our analysis on 148 existing cryptographic
algorithms is the first and only work that provides a comprehensive analysis on
symmetric-key encryption algorithms and cryptographic hash functions about
their specifications, requirements, and hardware structures. During our anal-
ysis, we mostly focused on architectural structure cryptographic algorithms,
where our aim is to bridge the gap between hardware designers and cryp-
tographic algorithm developers. We believe that such a detailed literature
survey will help both algorithm developers and researchers while designing
new cryptographic algorithms and/or standards, and hardware architects to
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design flexible crypto-specific processors achieving high performance. Even
though each algorithm has different structures and characteristics, we focused
on finding general patterns, common characteristics, and the features that
create diversity among algorithms. Unlike previous work, instead of focusing
on algorithms and features that suit best to our needs, we provide a broader
insight about cryptographic algorithms to enable users to pick their own al-
gorithm list and configure their environments and hardware based on their
needs.
3.2 Algorithm Selection
We studied more than a hundred ciphers and hash functions from Lu-
cifer[200] (1971) to present. Our algorithm selection process was solely based
on mostly used security protocols such as IPsec, TLS/SSL, WTLS, SSH,
S/MIME, and OpenPGP, and cryptographic libraries such as OpenSSL and
GNU Crypto. However, common security protocols and libraries do not cover
a wide range of algorithms. For that reason, we crawled the literature, patents
as well as famous competitions for security standards organized by National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), New European Schemes for
Signatures, Integrity and Encryption (NESSIE), eSTREAM, and European
Network of Excellence in Cryptology (ECRYPT). We analyzed not only the
winners but also all finalists and semi-finalists in these competitions. Finally,
our algorithm analysis consists of 148 cryptographic algorithms including 96
block ciphers, 26 stream ciphers, and 26 cryptographic hash functions.
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a. Block ciphers: A block cipher is a deterministic method of encrypting
text in a way that the algorithm is applied with user’s secret key to
fixed-length groups of bits at once as a block rather than to one bit at
a time. They rely on a fixed secret key and an unvarying transforma-
tion defined by the algorithm. Many block ciphers are characterized as
a Feistel network that divides the data block into two halves where one
half operates upon the other half. Block ciphers play a crucial role in the
design of cryptographic protocols and are widely used to encrypt large
bulk data. Due to the significant number of block ciphers in the liter-
ature, they represent a huge portion of existing algorithms used in our
study. Thus, they have a serious impact on the design of our processor
as well.
The list of block ciphers that we used in our analysis is as follows;
• 3WAY [55]
• AES [58]
• Akelarre [6]
• Anubis [19]
• ARIA [123]
• BaseKing [51]
• Blowfish [188]
• Camellia [10]
• CAST-128 [2]
• CAST-256 [3]
• CIKS-1 [150]
• Cipherunicorn-A
[182]
• Cipherunicorn-E
[183]
• CLEFIA [196]
• CMEA [172]
• COCONUT98 [210]
• Crab [115]
• Cryptomeria/C2 [37]
• CRYPTON [131]
• CS-Cipher [201]
• DEAL [118]
• DES [1]
• DESX [117]
• DFC [82]
• E2 [207]
• FEAL [194]
• FEALNX [149]
• FEA-M [226]
• FOX [114]
• FROG [81]
• GOST [169]
• Grand Cru [154]
• Hasty Pudding ci-
pher [190]
• Hierocrypt-3 [166]
• Hierocrypt-L1 [165]
• ICE [122]
• IDEA [125]
• Intel Cascade Cipher
[39]
• KeeLoq [42]
• KHAZAD [20]
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• Khufu and Khafre
[30]
• KLEIN [85]
• KN-Cipher [162]
• Ladder-DES [174]
• LED [91]
• LOKI97 [41]
• LUCIFER [200]
• M6 [116]
• M8 [164]
• MacGuffin [32]
• Madryga [135]
• MAGENTA [108]
• MARS [46]
• MBAL [120]
• Mercy [50]
• MESH [155]
• Kasumi [140]
• MMB [54]
• MULTI2 [15]
• MultiSwap [192]
• New Data Seal [22]
• NewDES [191]
• Nimbus [134]
• Noekeon [57]
• NUSH [222]
• NXT [113]
• PRESENT [35]
• PRINCE [36]
• Q [142]
• RC2 [119]
• RC5 [178]
• RC6 [180]
• REDOC III [197]
• SAFER K-128 [137]
• SAFER K-64 [136]
• SAFER+ [138]
• SC2000 [195]
• SEED [128]
• Serpent [9]
• SHACAL [95]
• SHACAL-2 [143]
• Shark [173]
• Skipjack [159]
• SMS4 [61]
• Spectr-H64 [88]
• Square [56]
• SXAL [163]
• TEA [216]
• Threefish [72]
• Twofish [189]
• UES [96]
• Xenon [209]
• Xmx [152]
• XTEA [157]
• XXTEA [225]
• Zodiac [127]
b. Stream Ciphers: A stream cipher is a deterministic method of encrypt-
ing text in which plaintext digits are combined with a pseudorandom
cipher key stream. Unlike block ciphers, stream ciphers work on smaller
chunks of data (usually one byte at a time), keep some sort of mem-
ory (called "state") while processing the plaintext, and use this state as
an input on the next stages. Stream ciphers are often used for their
speed and simplicity in applications where plaintext comes in quantities
of unknowable length like a secure wireless connection.
The list of stream ciphers that we used in our analysis is as follows;
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• A5/1 [83]
• A5/2 [168]
• Achterbahn [79]
• DECIM [23]
• FFCSR [11]
• FISH [33]
• GRAIN [97]
• HC256 [218]
• ISAAC [111]
• MICKEY [17]
• MUGI [214]
• PANAMA [52]
• Phelix [217]
• Py [29]
• Rabbit [34]
• RC4 [213]
• Salsa20 [24]
• Scream [94]
• SEAL [184]
• Sfinks [38]
• SNOW [65]
• Trivium [59]
• Turing [185]
• VEST [167]
• WAKE [215]
• Yamb [220]
c. Cryptographic Hash Functions: Cryptographic hash functions processes
an arbitrary finite length input message to a fixed length output referred
to as the hash value. Any changes in message or data (even slight ones)
potentially result in entirely different cryptographic hash value due to
the avalanche effect that is intentionally designed in the algorithm. The
desired security level for cryptographic hash functions is that it should
be impossible (i) to find two messages with substantially similar digests,
and (ii) to infer any useful information about the data using its digest.
Secure hash functions serve data integrity, non-repudiation, and authen-
ticity of the source in conjunction with the digital signature schemes.
For that reason, an ideal cryptographic hash function should be injec-
tive. Besides cryptographic hash functions already in use, we also in-
cluded finalists and semi-finalists proposals in recent SHA3 competition
into our algorithm analysis to cover recent algorithms as well.
The list of cryptographic hash functions that we used in our analysis is
as follows;
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• BLAKE [14]
• GOST [148]
• Groestl [80]
• HAS-160 [12]
• Haval [229]
• Hamsi [121]
• JH [219]
• Keccak [27]
• MD2 [177]
• MD4 [176]
• MD5 [175]
• MD6 [179]
• PANAMA [53]
• RadioGatÃžn [26]
• RIPEMD [62]
• RIPEMD-160 [63]
• SHA-0 [160]
• SHA-1 [64]
• SHA-2 [74]
• SHAvite3 [28]
• SipHash [13]
• Skein [73]
• Snefru [146]
• SWIFFT [133]
• TIGER [8]
• Whirlpool [21]
3.3 Analysis Methodology
We studied specifications of each cryptographic algorithm and manually
gathered detailed information about all aspects of these algorithms. During
our studies, we mainly focused on analyzing table sizes, addressing schemes,
operation classes, high-level sequence of operations, operation widths, and
connection structures of the 148 algorithms. Even though each algorithm has
different structures and characteristics, we focused on finding general pat-
terns, common characteristics, and the features that create diversity among
algorithms. The detailed results and discussions are presented in following
sections.
Besides manual analysis of 148 cryptographic algorithms, we created a
simple cryptography programming language and implemented a toolchain that
takes an algorithm, optimizes its control and data flow, generates a dataflow
graph, and cross compare of dataflows with other algorithms’ dataflow graphs
to extract common patterns and structures. Using our tools allowed us to
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extract pure data dependencies defined by the algorithm itself rather than
tool-specific or language-specific optimizations that would arise if we started
with a high-level language like C/C++. Due to the excessive amount of time
required to implement and process the dataflow analysis of each algorithm, we
limited our analysis to the most widely used algorithms in security protocols
and cryptographic libraries. Our dataflow graph analysis included not only
individual analysis for each algorithm but also cross comparisons of sub-graphs
between algorithms’ dataflow graphs.
3.4 Detailed Analysis
In this section, we provide a comprehensive analysis on each aspect of
cryptographic algorithms’ specifications and requirements. In following sec-
tions, we describe common operation classes in cryptographic algorithms, spe-
cial requirements in these operation classes, relations between other operations,
and some special needs of particular algorithms. Besides primitive operations
used in cryptographic algorithms, we also give a detailed analysis on essential
requirements for a good cryptographic processor such as parallel functional
units, their connections, and storage requirements.
3.4.1 Operation Classes
Our analysis suggested that primitive operations used in studied cryp-
tographic algorithms can be clustered in 5 operation classes: (i) arithmetic,
(ii) logical, (iii) table lookup, (iv) shift/rotate, and (v) permutation/expan-
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sion. The classes were determined based on which functional primitives are
used most frequently. There exists a few algorithms that require special func-
tional units; however, we didn’t include them in common operation classes
since they require special hardware and consideration and those algorithms
are not widely used. We discuss special functional units in following sections
separately. Primitive operations in each class can be summarized as follows;
Block
Ciphers
Stream
Ciphers
Hash
Functions
All
Logical Operation 96.9% 92.3% 96.2% 95.9%
Shifter/ Rotator 55.2% 88.5% 88.5% 66.9%
Table Lookup 68.8% 46.2% 34.6% 58.8%
Arithmetic Operation 42.7% 73.1% 65.4% 52.0%
Permutation /Expansion 39.6% 61.5% 38.5% 43.2%
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Figure 3.1: The use of operation classes in cryptographic algorithm classes
a. Arithmetic operation: The arithmetic operation class includes scalar
addition and subtraction over varying lengths. Since floating point num-
bers and operations are not used in cryptographic algorithms, hardware
support for floating point operations is not required. Even though arith-
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metic operations can be found in all cryptographic algorithm classes,
they are mostly used in stream ciphers. While there is no division op-
eration in cryptographic algorithms, the multiplication will be analyzed
separately as a special operation in following sections.
b. Logical operations: The logical operation class consists of bitwise prim-
itive operations; XOR, AND, OR, and NOT. As shown in Figure 3.1
even though the usage frequency varies among algorithm classes, logical
operations are the top most used functions in cryptographic algorithms.
More than 95% use one or more logical operations in their datapath.
In fact, cryptographic algorithms tend to perform a sequence of logical
operations; however, we will present more detailed analysis on operation
patterns in following sections. Even though any function can be repre-
sented as a sequence logical operations, the algorithms that do not re-
quire logical operations in their traditional implementations are KLEIN,
MultiSwap, PRESENT, SWIFFT, RC4, and Turing.
c. Table Lookup: The table lookup operation, also known as SBOX lookup,
replaces runtime computation with a simpler array indexing operation.
The table lookup operation is one of the most commonly used opera-
tions in block ciphers and provides non-linearity during the encryption
process. There is a literature [101, 109, 151] that provides computational
representations instead of table lookup operations to eliminate the use
of memory, but we consider them to be table lookup operations. This
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structure is not limited to explicit table lookup operations defined in
algorithm specifications. Some functional operations like matrix multi-
plication with a constant matrix can also be implemented as table lookup
operation using a precomputed table.
d. Shift/Rotate: Variable amount shift and rotation in both direction are
clustered in this class. Since shift and rotation operations enable chang-
ing the order of the bits in a reversible way, it is the second most com-
monly used operation class in all types of cryptographic algorithms.
e. Permutation/Expansion: Permutation/Expansion class is responsible
for any bit manipulation on up to 64-bit data. Since permutation and
expansion operations require an excessive amount of control signals, they
are not widely used. However, some portion of each algorithm class still
rely on this operation class. Some permutations, especially byte-wise,
can also be represented as a table lookup operation.
Our analysis on the use of each operation class in each crypto-system
class as well as overall distributions is summarized in Figure 3.1. A detailed
analysis on the use of functional units in cryptographic algorithms can be
found in Appendix A. More detailed information about operation clusters is
presented in Appendix B. Based on targeted cryptographic algorithm classes,
the structure and amount of functional units can be changed while designing
cryptographic processor.
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3.4.2 Table Lookup Structure
Since table lookup is one of the most common operations, we exam-
ined each aspect of the table structure of cryptographic algorithms in detail.
We analyzed table sizes, entry widths, addressing schemes, number of different
tables, and the number of parallel tables in each algorithm. With a table struc-
ture that is too wide, resources are wasted. Additional lookups are required for
a table structure that is too narrow. Therefore, table size and entry wide are
crucial elements in the design of cryptographic processor. Our studies show
that table sizes and addressing schemes greatly vary among crypto-systems.
The table sizes used in cryptographic algorithms vary from 16 to 1024 entries
while the entry width starts from 4-bit and goes up to 64-bit. Figure 3.2 shows
that more than 70 percent of the algorithms using table lookup consist of ta-
bles with 256-entry. However, an ideal generic cryptographic processor should
support as many algorithms as possible. Thus, in the light of studied algo-
rithms, table lookup unit structures should be mostly 256-entry tables with
support for any table size up to 1024 entries.
The width of the table entry is another important consideration on
lookup table structure, since unnecessarily large entry width may cause waste
of resources while insufficient entry width may result in loss of performance.
Figure 3.3 shows that 8-bit and 32-bit are the most common entry widths
among the algorithms that use table lookup operation; 51.3% and 23.3% re-
spectively.
Our algorithm analysis shows that even though there are some outlier
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16-entry 128-entry 256-entry 512-entry 1024-entry
Block Ciphers 15.2% 0.0% 71.2% 3.0% 1.5%
Stream Ciphers 0.0% 8.3% 66.7% 8.3% 16.7%
Hash Functions 11.1% 11.1% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0%
All 12.6% 2.3% 70.1% 3.4% 3.4%
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Figure 3.2: The ratio of different table sizes used in cryptographic algorithms
algorithms with different table sizes, the most common table structures are
256x32-bit and 256x8-bit. Since there is only one algorithm, KHAZAD [20],
which stores 64-bit data in the table, a reasonable table entry size is 32-bit,
since any table with 64-bit data entries can be divided into two parallel tables
and outputs of both lookup operations can be combined.
Moreover, our algorithm analysis suggests that there are maximum
of four parallel 1024-entry, eight parallel 512-entry, and sixteen parallel 256-
entry tables in any specific cryptographic algorithm. Therefore, the table
lookup structure of reconfigurable cryptographic processor should ideally be
capable of supporting the table size requirements of all existing algorithms
29
4-bit 8-bit 24-bit 32-bit 64-bit
Block Ciphers 24.2% 53.0% 1.5% 18.2% 1.5%
Stream Ciphers 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0%
Hash Functions 33.3% 44.4% 0.0% 22.2% 0.0%
All 21.8% 51.7% 1.1% 23.0% 1.1%
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Figure 3.3: The ratio of different table entry widths used in cryptographic
algorithms
for both the size of one table (4 KB), and the total size of parallel tables in
algorithm (16 KB) as well as maximum number of parallel lookup operations
(16 operations). Any structure that does not meet these requirements may
cause lower performance even though they might save some other resources
like area and power.
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of number of parallel lookup operations
in cryptographic algorithms. Even though some of the the SHA-3 candidates
such as Groestl, Hamsi, and JH use 128 and 256 parallel lookup operations in
their bit-slice implementation, we do not include them as maximum number
of parallel lookup operations.
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Table 3.1: The distribution number of parallel lookup operation in crypto-
graphic algorithms
1 2 4 8 16+
Block Ciphers 3.0% 3.0% 22.7% 43.9% 27.3%
Stream Ciphers 16.7% 33.3% 33.3% 16.7% 0.0%
Hash Functions 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 22.2% 66.7%
All 4.6% 6.9% 23.0% 37.9% 27.6%
3.4.3 Bundled Operation Patterns
Cryptographic algorithms process a sequence of operations on a fix-
sized block of data. Their fairly regular structures enable bundling commonly
executed sequences of operations as a single big operation block. We studied
the possibility of such bundles and examined the ratio of algorithms that use
these bundles. The result of our study gave us better insight about general
trends in cryptographic algorithms, enabling to design a better cryptographic
processors.
As we mentioned earlier, logical operators are the most commonly used
operations, and cryptographic algorithms tend to perform a sequence of logical
operations back to back. Our studies show that more than half of all crypto-
graphic algorithms process three consecutive logical operations. As shown in
Figure 3.4, 82.4% of the algorithms that we studied process two consecutive
logical operations while 58.8% process three, and 57.7% of the cryptographic
hash functions process four or more in a row.
Our algorithm and dataflow graph analysis suggest that in most of the
cryptographic algorithms table lookup operations are preceded and/or followed
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Block Ciphers Stream Ciphers Hash Functions All
Logic Op 2 79.2% 73.1% 100.0% 81.8%
Logic Op 3 51.0% 57.7% 84.6% 58.1%
Logic Op 4+ 25.0% 30.8% 57.7% 31.8%
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Figure 3.4: The distribution of logical operation patterns in cryptographic
algorithms
by an XOR operation. Table 3.2 shows that XOR-SBOX, SBOX-XOR and
XOR-SBOX-XOR operation bundles are processed in 69.0%, 71.4%, and 59.5%
of the algorithms that have table lookup operations, respectively.
Besides the pattern of XOR and SBOX operations, we also analyzed the
possibility of other bundles between other operation classes. The second most
common relation between operation classes is the pattern of shift/rotate and
logical operations. Table 3.3 summarizes that Logic-Shift/rotate, Shift/rotate-
Logic, and Logic-Shift/rotate-Logic operation bundles are processed in 44.4%,
49.5%, and 34.3% of algorithms using shift/rotate operations, respectively.
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Table 3.2: The distribution of XOR and SBOX patterns in cryptographic
algorithms
XOR-SBOX SBOX-XOR XOR-SBOX-XOR
Block Ciphers 76.9% 76.9% 66.2%
Stream Ciphers 27.3% 36.4% 18.2%
Hash Functions 62.5% 75.0% 62.5%
All 69.0% 71.4% 59.5%
Table 3.3: The distribution of Shift/rotate and logic operation patterns in
cryptographic algorithms
Logic Op. -
Shift/rotate
Shift/rotate -
Logic Op.
Logic Op. -
Shift/rotate -
Logic Op.
Block Ciphers 56.6% 50.9% 39.6%
Stream Ciphers 21.7% 60.9% 21.7%
Hash Functions 39.1% 34.8% 34.8%
All 44.4% 49.5% 34.3%
Due to the significant amount of XOR and arithmetic operations in
cryptographic algorithms, we analyzed the frequency of XOR and arithmetic
operation patterns. Table 3.4 shows that XOR-Arithmetic, Arithmetic-XOR,
and XOR-Arithmetic-XOR operation bundles are processed in 43.4%, 38.2%,
and 35.5% of algorithms using arithmetic operations, respectively.
3.4.4 Special Functional Units
As mentioned above, there are some cryptographic algorithms that re-
quire special functional units to achieve higher performance or even to be
supported. Even though some of those special functions can be realized by
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Table 3.4: The distribution of XOR and Arithmetic operation patterns in
cryptographic algorithms
XOR -
Arithmetic
Op.
Arithmetic
Op. - XOR
XOR -
Arithmetic Op.
- XOR
Block Ciphers 51.2% 46.3% 41.5%
Stream Ciphers 15.8% 10.5% 10.5%
Hash Functions 56.3% 50.0% 50.0%
All 43.4% 38.2% 35.5%
other operation classes or by a logical combination of those other operation
classes, they may also require special logic or dedicated hardware. Our anal-
ysis shows that the most commonly required special operations are integer
multiplication, byte-wise rotation, and modular arithmetic.
Table 3.5: The special functional unit requirements in cryptographic algo-
rithms
Byte Rotator Multiplication ModularArithmetic
Block Ciphers 24.0% 13.5% 43.8%
Stream Ciphers 19.2% 3.8% 73.1%
Hash Functions 34.6% 11.5% 61.5%
All 25.0% 11.5% 52.0%
Our studies indicate that only 11.5 percent of cryptographic algorithms
that we analyzed use integer multiplication (Table 3.5). In fact, these 17 out of
148 crypto-systems are not common and not included in mostly used security
protocols or cryptographic libraries. Therefore, dedicated multiplication hard-
ware may or may not be a necessary component of cryptographic processor
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depending on target workload. The list of algorithm that explicitly requires
multiplication is as follows;
Block Ciphers: Cipherunicorn-A [182], CLEFIA [196], DFC [82], FEA-
M [226], IDEA [125], KN-cipher [162], MESH [155], MMB [54], Mul-
tiSwap [192], Nimbus [134], RC6 [180], SC2000 [195], and Xenon
[209]
Stream Ciphers: Rabbit [34]
Hash Functions: PANAMA [53], SWIFFT [133], and TIGER [8]
As shown in Table 3.5, one-fourth of all algorithms use simple byte-
wise rotation on 32-bit data instead of a variable amount. Although byte-wise
rotation is a part of the shift/rotate operation class, hardware implementation
is less expensive and can be affordably combined with other classes. On the
other hand, a shift/rotate unit working on varying granularities is not nec-
essary since only 1% of all cryptographic algorithms require them, and any
granularity can be easily implemented using permutation/expansion class.
Our algorithm analysis suggests that modular arithmetic is one of the
most common special operation used in cryptographic algorithms, especially
among stream ciphers. Theoretically, the simple form of modular arithmetic
(addition, subtraction, and multiplication) is not a special function since it
just allows the values always staying less than a fixed number, called base or
modulus. As a general rule, we do not want the encryption process to have a
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big affect on the size of a message. Thus, modular arithmetic allows to keep the
operation size within a chosen range. Since modular arithmetic is very well
understood in terms of algorithms over various basic operations, it became
the primary choice of operation for cryptographic algorithm developers and
included in 52% of all cryptographic algorithms (Table 3.5).
Table 3.6: The modular arithmetic base distribution in cryptographic algo-
rithms
mod(28) mod(216) mod(232) mod(264) Others
Block Ciphers 9.5% 2.4% 73.8% 7.1% 7.1%
Stream Ciphers 26.3% 5.3% 63.2% 0.0% 5.3%
Hash Functions 0.0% 0.0% 93.8% 6.3% 0.0%
All 11.7% 2.6% 75.3% 5.2% 5.2%
Any crypto-system that uses modular arithmetic can be constructed
in an analogous way with a group having certain properties under associated
group of operations. Therefore, due to the choice of the base value, a sig-
nificant portion of modular arithmetic operations can be implemented using
existing operation classes or with a logical combination of them. Table 3.6
shows that 75.3 percent of modular arithmetic operations in studied crypto-
graphic algorithms use 232 as the base value, while more than 90 percent of
modular arithmetic operations can be realized using traditional integer arith-
metic combined with an AND operation.
On the other hand, there are 5 different cryptographic algorithms that
require special hardware or logic to be supported due to their unorthodox
base choice for modular arithmetic; specifically 233 for KN-cipher [162], 232−1
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Figure 3.5: The coverage ratio of algorithms that require modular arithmetic
for MMB [54], 264 + 13 for DFC [82], 17 for PANAMA [52], and 2256 for
GOST [148]. Therefore, 94.6 percent of all cryptographic algorithms that
we analyzed can be implemented without requiring any complicated logic to
combine existing operation classes while only small portion of each algorithm
classes does require special consideration, specifically 6.3% of block ciphers,
3.8% of stream ciphers, and 3.8% of hash functions. (Figure 3.5). That is;
the choice of target algorithms has a significant impact on designing special
hardware for cryptography.
3.4.5 Processing Element Width
After examining operation classes, required special functional units,
detailed internal structure of operation classes, and their relations with each
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other we focused on finding the optimal processor width for cryptographic al-
gorithms. Even though all algorithms can be implemented by one repeatedly
used set of functional units (FUs), where each FU implements one operation
class, multiple sets of FUs can often improve performance by exploiting par-
allelism inherent in most of the algorithms. In this thesis, each set of FUs is
called a processing element (PE). We examined how much performance gains
there would be at various numbers of PEs.
1-way 2-way 4-way 8-way 16-way
Block Ciphers 9.4% 30.2% 51.0% 7.3% 2.1%
Stream Ciphers 0.0% 23.1% 53.8% 23.1% 0.0%
Hash Functions 0.0% 23.1% 61.5% 11.5% 3.8%
All 6.1% 27.7% 53.4% 10.8% 2.0%
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Figure 3.6: The distribution of algorithms requires 1, 2, 4, 8 and 16-way
processing elements
The distribution of algorithms that require 1-, 2-, 4-, 8- and 16-way
PEs is summarized in Figure 3.6. More detailed parallel processing element
requirements of each algorithm can be found in Appendix D. Our analysis
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shows that the majority of algorithms fully utilize four-way PEs while 87.2%
of cryptographic algorithms requires four or less parallel PEs for maximum
performance. Although 19 out of 148 algorithms benefit from eight- or sixteen-
way PEs, these algorithms can still be implemented on a four-way processor.
Therefore, only a small portion of algorithms can get a performance benefit
out of the hardware with 8- or 16-way. On the other hand, designing a 8- or
16-way crypto-processor will potentially result in underutilization of resources
for the most of the algorithms, and increase the complexity and cost of the
communication among PEs.
3.4.6 Connection Structures
As we discussed in the previous section, a significant portion of crypto-
graphic algorithms that we studied requires multiple PEs running in parallel.
Multiple parallel PEs create a need of the connection structure, which drives
us to examine the data and control flow of algorithms that use multiple parallel
PEs.
Our studies show that cryptographic algorithms tend to have regular or
slightly complex connection structure between parallel operations. In general,
algorithms work on different blocks of actual data or different bytes of one
data block. However, there exists some algorithms that have very complex or
control intensive structures due to their characteristics. As shown in Figure
3.7, more than 80 percent of the cryptographic algorithms has fairly regular
control structure, while more than 30 percent of stream ciphers require a more
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Figure 3.7: The trend of connection structure among processing elements used
for implementing algorithms
complex structure to control their dataflow. The main reason that stream
ciphers have a more complex control structure is that they generally apply
a complex sequence of operations to the same block in various ways. Some
examples are covered in following chapters.
For a moderate reconfigurable crypto-processor, having a set of con-
nection schemes based on analysis of existing connection structure would be
sufficient. However, a generic cryptographic processor requires more flexibility
to support future standards and, therefore, needs higher connectivity.
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3.4.7 Storage Requirements
The complex and control intensive dataflow of stream ciphers requires
frequent control switches throughout the execution of the algorithm. Our al-
gorithm analysis shows that more than half of stream ciphers and 20.9% of all
cryptographic algorithms require a structure that can control more than 40
consecutive operations for their round functions due to changing round struc-
tures or changing function length. On the other hand, most of the block ciphers
and cryptographic hash functions have very regular structures as shown in Fig-
ure 3.7. Due to their unvarying transformation structures, control signals are
expected to remain mostly constant throughout the execution of whole algo-
rithm. Since our project aims to achieve highest performance and flexibility
for a wide range of algorithms, we believe that an ideal cryptographic proces-
sor should accommodates at least the largest of control structure required for
any existing algorithm. It is obvious that analyzing existing algorithms does
not provide the information that will definitely be valid for future algorithms
as well. However, existing algorithms can give an approximate idea about
potential lengths of future algorithms.
Besides control structures, we also analyzed the register file usage of
cryptographic algorithms. Since it is expected that most algorithms have fairly
regular dataflow between pipeline stages, we only examined the explicit register
usage of the algorithms. Our studies indicate that an ideal reconfigurable
cryptographic processor should have a register file structure with 256 32-bit
entries, and should be capable of updating at least four registers in each cycle.
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Such register file represents the smallest possible structure that will support
all the algorithms that we studied. Future standards may or may not require
more registers and/or more parallel updates.
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Chapter 4
Cryptographic Algorithm Instrumentation
In this chapter, we describe our cryptographic algorithm implementa-
tion/verification process and how we profiled the algorithms, and provide a
detailed instrumentation results on implemented cryptographic algorithms.
4.1 Existing Binary Instrumentation of Cryptographic
Algorithms
Even though there have been numerous attempts to improve the perfor-
mance of cryptographic algorithms, only a few papers analyze cryptographic
algorithms and present a hardware-focused analysis of such algorithms [77, 206,
208, 224]. In those papers, however, algorithm analysis is limited to a small
set of cryptographic algorithms and, even then, only determine which classes
of operations should be supported. However, a detailed profiling and manual
analysis is crucial to extend existing instruction sets and more importantly to
design a high performance reconfigurable cryptographic processor.
To achieve that, there are papers that profiled the software implemen-
tations of a set of cryptographic algorithms [44, 47, 75]. Those papers give
detailed information about cryptographic operation classes, how frequently
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each is used, and the instructions used. They are, however, also restricted to
a small set of algorithms.
Burke et al. [44] profiled eight benchmarks: Blowfish, 3DES, Mars,
RC4, RC6, IDEA, Rijndael, and Twofish to show possible hardware factors for
the performance bottlenecks such as the issue width, the number of function
units, and the computation and memory access intensive parts. They used
their analysis results to propose extended instructions such as 16-bit modular
multiplication, bit permutation, rotation, and memory table lookup.
Fiskiran [75] used the PLX toolset to perform workload analysis of the
cipher suite including DES, 3DES, RC4, Blowfish, AES, Twofish, and MARS
using RISC-like instruction set. They used the PLX RISC architecture and
divided the instructions into seven classes: Store, Load, Arithmetic, Logical,
Shift, and Branch (conditional and unconditional) and reported the ratio of
these instruction classes. Their analysis provides (i) the execution cycles used
per block of encryption, (ii) the round operations in each cipher, and (iii) the
fraction of the execution time consumed by round operations. However, their
analysis on a very limited algorithm set fails to provide sufficient insight for a
reconfigurable high performance crypto-hardware.
Chang et al. [47] performed a profiling and performance analysis on
AES, 3DES, Blowfish, IDEA, RC5, MD5, SHA1, ECC, and RSA using Intel’s
commercial products VTune and PIN tool on Intel Core i7 processor. They
clustered the instructions to seven class (binary arithmetic, bit&byte, control
transfer, data transfer, logical, shift&rotation, miscellaneous) and provided fre-
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quency of each group in each algorithm, as well as presenting memory readwrite
accesses. They also defined and analyzed a concept called "Load-Store Block"
(LSB), which is a single basic block starting with a LOAD instruction and end-
ing with a STORE instruction. Such analysis provides a good insight about
how to construct Processor-in-Memory (PiM) architectures. Even though the
provided information is useful for cryptography community, the analysis is
still limited to nine algorithms and lacks deeper understanding and informa-
tion about useful FUs for a flexible high performance crypto-processor.
4.2 Instrumentation Methodology
Even though we analyzed the usage of operation classes in crypto-
graphic algorithms, we believe that the usage frequency of each operation
class in algorithms is an important information that may greatly help design-
ing cryptographic processor. To achieve more accurate analysis, we choose
to profile software implementation of algorithms automatically using binary
instrumentation tool.
We used Intel’s PIN [104] as our primary profiling tool. PIN is a
dynamic binary instrumentation tool that instrument compiled code to col-
lect data such as instruction mix, instruction address trace, memory reference
trace, load-store trace, etc. while the executable is running. Such information
may help us better understand cryptographic algorithms’ behaviours and the
frequency of each operation class used in those algorithms.
Due to the excessive amount of time required to implement and verify
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each algorithm, we implemented only 79 of the 148 algorithms, consisting of 48
block ciphers, 13 stream ciphers, and 18 cryptographic hash functions. Each
algorithm is implemented in C using reference implementation or description
and verified using reference test vectors. To get more accurate results about
algorithms’ encryption structure, we profiled the algorithms by isolating the
encryption function from other structures. Doing so eliminate the bias and in-
correct information caused by data preparation, initialization, statistic print-
ing, function calls, etc. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the most
comprehensive profiling analysis on the largest algorithm set.
Table 4.1: Instruction Classes
Class Instructions
BA ADD, ADC, SUB, SBB, INC, DEC, NEG
BB SETB, SETNBE, SETNLE, SETNZ, SETZ, TEST
L AND, NOT, OR, XOR
SR ROL, ROR, SAR, SHL, SHR, SHRD, BSWAP
CT CALL_NEAR, INT, JB, JBE, JL, JLE, JMP, JNB, JNBE, JNL, JNLE,JNS, JNZ, JP, JRCXZ, JS, JZ, LEAVE, RET_NEAR
DT
CDQE, CMOVS, CMP, CMOVB, CMOVBE, CMOVNB, CMOVNBE,
CMOVNS, CMOVNZ, CMOVZ, CMPXCHG, CLD, CWDE, MOV,
MOVSB, MOVSD, MOVSW, MOVSX, MOVZX, POP, PUSH, XADD,
XCHG, CMPSB, SCASB, STOSB, STOSD
SF DIV, IDIV, MUL, IMUL
M LEA, NOP, RDTSC
We compiled all the algorithms into IA-32 assembly instructions with
x64 using GCC v4.8.2. As shown in Table 7.2, the instructions found in the
outputs are grouped into eight classes based on their functionality: Binary
Arithmetic instructions (BA), Bit and Byte instructions (BB), Control Trans-
fer instructions (CT), Data Transfer instructions (DT), Logical instructions
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(L), Shift and Rotate instructions (SR), Special Functional instructions (SF),
and Miscellaneous instructions (M) [203].
4.3 Detailed Analysis
In this section, we give a comprehensive analysis on different aspects of
cryptographic algorithms that we gathered from dynamic instrumentation of
cryptographic algorithms.
Table 4.2: Instruction Class Frequencies
BA BB L SR CT DT SF M
Block Ciphers 10.6% 0.8% 12.8% 7.5% 3.3% 61.6% 0.3% 2.6%
Stream Ciphers 13.6% 0.5% 7.2% 6.7% 3.2% 63.7% 0.0% 4.5%
Hash Functions 11.0% 0.2% 12.8% 7.2% 2.6% 63.0% 0.3% 1.6%
All 11.0% 0.6% 12.4% 7.3% 3.1% 62.2% 0.3% 2.5%
Table 4.3: Operation Class Frequencies
Arithmetic Logical ShiftRotate Permutation
Block Ciphers 36.0% 38.5% 22.4% 3.1%
Stream Ciphers 49.9% 26.7% 21.6% 1.8%
Hash Functions 37.9% 41.9% 19.3% 0.8%
All 38.0% 38.1% 21.6% 2.4%
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 shows the average usage frequency of each
instruction class as well as the usage frequency of operation classes that we
described before while Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of each class with
minimum, maximum, and the distribution around the median.
Due to profiling methodology of PIN, it is not possible to collect array
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Figure 4.1: Instruction and Operation Class Distribution
and table accesses through binary instrumentation. Thus, operation class us-
age frequencies do not include table lookup operations. Since permutation/ex-
pansion operations can also be implemented as table lookup; our results only
include explicit bit/byte instructions as permutation/expansion operations.
Our analysis shows that Data Transfer class is mostly used instruction class
in all algorithms. Binary Arithmetic and Logical instruction classes, which
defines the actual algorithm path, account for the majority of remaining in-
struction count; averaging 11.0% and 12.4% with the maximum of 30.48%
and 45.45% respectively. The Control Transfer class accounts for only 3%
of the instruction count on the average and used mainly in fixed loops for
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round structure rather than data-dependent control flow. As mentioned be-
fore, multiplication is not a common operation in cryptographic algorithms.
Our analysis shows that Special Functional instructions, such as multiply, are
used 0.3% on the average and 3.83% of the time at most.
Table 4.4: Distribution of Memory Accesses
Data
read
Data
write
IP-
relative
read
IP-
relative
write
Stack
read
Stack
write
Block Ciphers 69.23% 88.49% 0.51% 0.12% 30.26% 11.39%
Stream Ciphers 65.51% 92.08% 0.98% 0.10% 33.51% 7.82%
Hash Functions 66.61% 89.09% 0.08% 0.00% 33.32% 10.91%
All 68.00% 89.23% 0.49% 0.09% 31.51% 10.68%
Table 4.5: Distribution of Data Read/Write Granularities
Data
read
(1B)
Data
read
(2B)
Data
read
(4B)
Data
read
(8B)
Data
write
(1B)
Data
write
(2B)
Data
write
(4B)
Data
write
(8B)
Block Ciphers 8.38% 0.61% 19.68% 15.80% 2.65% 0.32% 7.08% 3.23%
Stream Ciphers 8.04% 0.21% 18.25% 19.14% 3.47% 0.12% 6.04% 2.31%
Hash Functions 3.97% 0.14% 19.65% 20.01% 0.69% 0.07% 5.82% 5.35%
All 7.30% 0.43% 19.43% 17.33% 2.33% 0.23% 6.61% 3.56%
Even though we could not accurately analyze the table lookup fre-
quency, we analyzed the memory access types and access granularities to pro-
vide better insight about memory accesses. PIN categorizes memory accesses
as Instruction Pointer Relative (IP-relative), Stack, and Data read/write ac-
cesses, as well as 1B, 2B, 4B, and 8B granularities of data accesses. Our anal-
ysis on cryptographic algorithms shows that while Data reads/writes occupy
57.23% of memory access on the average, Stack accesses is the second heavily
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used access type with 42.19%. The detailed distribution of access types and
access granularities is shown in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, respectively. Even
though such information does not help us to understand table lookups better,
it may give insight for designing memory sub-structure of the processor.
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Chapter 5
Cryptoraptor: Reconfigurable Cryptographic
Processor
In this chapter, we describe a high performance, power efficient, and
highly flexible cryptographic processor, Cryptoraptor, that supports a wide
range of existing ciphers and cryptographic hash functions as well as potential
future ones. The name of our processor is inspired by a genus of dinosaur;
meaning "secret thief". The fast and flexible nature of Cryptoraptor represents
our high throughput processor that is highly flexible for both existing and
future cryptographic algorithms. In following sections, we explain our design
methodology and provide detailed information about different aspects of our
processor.
5.1 Design Methodology
As stated earlier, the primary goal of our project is to have a complete,
flexible, and high performance cryptographic processor that can support a
wide range of symmetric-key encryption algorithms and cryptographic hash
functions. To achieve that, we started our design process by analyzing existing
cryptographic algorithms as we described in previous chapters. We believe that
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designing high performance reconfigurable cryptographic processor depends on
such a detailed analysis of existing algorithms, which may also give an idea
about future requirements as well. For that reason, we combined the results of
both algorithm and dataflow analysis as well as our algorithm profiling results
to design our cryptographic processor.
During the design of our processor, we focused on having a flexible
architecture that can be generic for ciphers and hash functions instead of an
optimized processor that achieves higher throughput on a particular algorithm
or a predefined set of algorithms only, which makes our cryptographic processor
unique compared to related work.
We put our effort to achieve high throughput and flexibility without
optimizing our processor for area or power. The performance and reconfigura-
bility of our processor are analyzed and discussed in the following chapters.
Since achieving high performance while having high degree of flexibility
requires special considerations, we also considered both FGPA and ASIC as
implementation platforms. Even though flexibility is the key component of
FPGAs, we focused on ASIC implementations for performance while providing
flexibility within our design. The following sections provide more detailed
information on our implementation process.
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5.2 Cryptoraptor
At a high level, the Cryptoraptor architecture consists of an Execution
Tile as the functional part that performs the bulk computation, a State Engine
(SE) that controls the Execution Tile, and a 256-entry register file. The high-
level structure is shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: The internal structure of Cryptoraptor
The SE is a hardware state machine that is configured as part of the
initial setup and remains constant as long as the algorithm being executed does
not change. The SE consists of a state counter and a small control memory
block. By eliminating fetch and decode stages of conventional processors, the
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majority of the area and power is consumed by the Execution Tile, yielding
higher area and power efficiency.
The Execution Tile consists of multiple identical stages, each contain-
ing a number of Processing Elements (PEs) connected to the next stage by
Connection Row (CR). As shown in Figure 5.1, it consists of a number of PEs
and CRs, and loopback connections from each stage to a register file.
The implementation details, as well as timing, area, power, and power
analysis of Cryptoraptor will be analyzed and discussed in following chapters.
Chapter 6 also discusses the algorithm coverage of our processor while example
algorithm mappings are provided in Chapter 7.
5.3 Execution Tile
As shown in Figure 5.2, the Execution Tile consists of varying number
of rows of PEs and CRs as well as loopback connections from each stage to a
register file.
Our analysis suggests that 87.2% of cryptographic algorithms require
four or less parallel PEs for maximum performance while only 19 out of 148
algorithms benefit from eight-way and sixteen-way PEs. An eight-way or
sixteen-way crypto-processor will potentially result in underutilization of re-
sources for the most of the algorithms and increase the complexity and cost
of the communication across PEs. Therefore, Cryptoraptor consists of four
parallel and independently configurable PEs in each stage, called PE row.
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Figure 5.2: The high level structure of Execution Tile
In the light of our algorithm analysis, we decided that 20-stages of PE
rows and CRs with a 256-entry register file is the optimal configuration in
the Execution Tile . Therefore, the processor can provide up to 80 logical
stages by fully utilizing the control memory that provides four distinct stage
images. Smaller numbers of pipeline stages can be realized using register
file loopbacks and partial configuration of PEs in each stage. The flexibility
of storing intermediate results from any stage to a register file enables us
to utilize any portion of the processor for computation and to have varying
number of pipeline stages for different algorithms. Due to its independently
configurable structure, any PE individually and/or a PE row as a whole can
be turned on/off depending on the algorithm to have a better fit and further
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power efficiency.
The Execution Tile takes 4x20 4B inputs, processes through N level of
PE and CRs (N=20 for Cryptoraptor), and update up to eight 4B registers
per cycle. As mentioned in previous sections, the cryptographic algorithms
may need up to four register updates per cycle, but we allow each PE row to
generate up to eight register update candidates to achieve a higher degree of
flexibility.
5.4 Connection Row
The Connection Row (CR) is a crossbar that connects any PE from the
previous stage to any PE in the next stage. That is, it is capable of connecting
12xN outputs in stage i to 20xN inputs in stage j, where N is the number of
parallel PEs in each stage (N=20 for Cryptoraptor). Although full crossbar
topology has a significant impact on the cycle time of our processor (analyzed
and discussed in following chapters), it increases the flexibility of our design
and allows us to support more algorithms efficiently. This unit can also be
structured with a predefined set of connection schemes between functional
units based on pattern analysis on existing algorithms. However, doing so will
potentially limit the capabilities of our processor for future algorithms.
A CR consists of four parallel PE connectors, each of which prepares all
inputs of corresponding PE in the next stage. Each PE connector is configured
using a 120-bit control signal; 6 bits for each PE input in the next stage. The
control signal structure of a PE connector is summarized in Table 5.1. Most
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Table 5.1: The control structure of one PE connector
Control index # Output destination
control[5:0] AU operand #0
control[11:6] AU operand #1
control[17:12] AU operand #2
control[23:18] AU operand #3
control[29:24] LOU operand #0
control[35:30] LOU operand #1
control[41:36] LOU operand #2
control[47:42] LOU operand #3
control[53:48] LOU operand #4
control[59:54] LOU operand #5
control[65:60] TLU operand #0
control[71:66] TLU operand #1
control[77:72] TLU operand #2
control[83:78] TLU operand #3
control[89:84] SRU operand #0
control[95:90] SRU operand #1
control[101:96] SRU operand #3
control[107:102] SRU operand #4
control[113:108] PEU operand #0
control[119:114] PEU operand #1
significant two bits of six selection bits per PE connector to select one of the
4 PEs in the previous stage. Table 5.2 describes how the remaining four bits
select one among twelve 32-bit outputs of the selected PE in the previous
stage.
Our algorithm analysis suggests that the cryptographic algorithms may
need up to four register updates per cycle. We extended this requirement for
each PE row to provide a high degree of flexibility. Besides controlling connec-
tions between PEs, a CR is also responsible for controlling up to eight outputs
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Table 5.2: The input selection structure of PE connector (least significant 4
bits of 6 selection bits)
CONNcontrol[3:0] Functional Unit
0000 AU out
0001 AU out (shifted)
0010 LOU out
0011 LOU out (shifted)
0100 TLU out #0
0101 TLU out #0 (shifted)
0110 TLU out #1
0111 TLU out #2
1000 TLU out #3
1001 SRU out
1010 PEU out #0
1011 PEU out #1
from all stages to be stored to the register file. By providing eight parallel
register file write port, we doubled the requirements of existing symmetric-key
encryption algorithms and hash functions. The flexibility of storing interme-
diate results from any stage enables us to utilize any portion of Cryptoraptor
and to have a different number of pipeline stages for each algorithm. Thus,
any PE individually and/or a PE row can be turned on/off as needed by the
algorithm. The control structure enables users to configure only required PEs
and corresponding PE connectors or even a small portion of a single PE and
PE connector. Since selecting 8 outputs requires 8x6-bit control signal, the
total number bits of control in CR is (8x6)+(4x120) bits, and organized as
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follows;
control = {RegOutSLCT ||PEconnectorCTRL} where
RegOutSLCT = {OUTslct7 ||OUTslct6 || . . . ||OUTslct1 ||OUTslct0}
(5.1)
A control memory block associated with each CR. Each CR control
memory can hold up to 4 sets of control signals that are loaded at the beginning
and controlled by the central state machine of the processor. The control
interface of a CR consists of one 32-bit input for control load and a 7-bit
control signal defined as follows;
CONNcontrol = {WriteEnable ||State ||WordAddress} (5.2)
The control memory of a CR is loaded by 32-bit data chunks, and
address of each word is controlled by 2-bit State and 4-bit WordAddress.
Throughout the control loading process, the WriteEnable bit of CR state
control signal must be asserted. All other times control memory is in read-
only mode. Loading the control signals of single CR may take up to 17 cycles
depending on the amount of control signals needed to implement an algorithm.
The control structure and addressing flexibility enable users to configure only
corresponding PE connectors or even small portion of one PE connector.
5.5 Processing Element Row
The Processing Element Row is encapsulation module to organize par-
allel PEs in each level. The proposed structure contains four parallel and
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independently configured PEs in a row. Thus, one PE row takes four sets
of 20x4B as inputs and 4x7-bit control signals to produce four sets of 12x4B
outputs. Each PE has its own control memory and is configured separately
using the same interface.
5.6 Processing Element
A Processing Element (PE) is the smallest execution element of our
cryptographic processor which includes one of each functional units: an Arith-
metic Unit (AU), a Logical Operation Unit (LOU), a Table Lookup Unit
(TLU), a Shifter-Rotator Unit (SRU), and a Permutation-Expansion Unit
(PEU).
Figure 5.3: High level unit structure of a Processing Element
Our analysis on cryptographic algorithms suggests that even though
variable amount shift and rotate operations are needed in crypto-systems, one-
fourth of the algorithms use byte-wise rotation instead. This ratio becomes
as high as 34.6 percent in cryptographic hash functions. Thus, we integrated
byte-wise rotation operation to the output of AU, LOU, and TLU without
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adding significant overhead to the cycle time of our processor. The overhead
of having byte-wise rotation unit is further analyzed and discussed in following
chapters. Having such byte-wise rotation unit allows us to have both original
and 1, 2, or 3-byte rotated outputs, which is very desirable for some algorithms
to reduce the total number of cycles and eliminate redundant and/or duplicate
operations. Figure 5.3 shows high-level unit structure of a PE.
Table 5.3: The input structure of PE
Input # Functional Unit
0 AU operand #0
1 AU operand #1
2 AU operand #2
3 AU operand #3
4 LOU operand #0
5 LOU operand #1
6 LOU operand #2
7 LOU operand #3
8 LOU operand #4
9 LOU operand #5
10 TLU operand #0
11 TLU operand #1
12 TLU operand #2
13 TLU operand #3
14 SRU operand #0
15 SRU operand #1
16 SRU operand #2
17 SRU operand #3
18 PEU operand #0
19 PEU operand #1
Since each of these functional units can work concurrently on different
inputs, a PE takes twenty 4B inputs and produces twelve 4B outputs. Thus,
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Table 5.4: The output structure of PE
Output # Functional Unit
0 AU out
1 AU out (shifted)
2 LOU out
3 LOU out (shifted)
4 TLU out #0
5 TLU out #0 (shifted)
6 TLU out #1
7 TLU out #2
8 TLU out #3
9 SRU out
10 PEU out #0
11 PEU out #1
the proposed PE is capable of utilizing all functional units in parallel to gen-
erate up to twelve outputs. Since each unit is independently bypassable, PEs
can also forward six different inputs to next stages. Table 5.3 and 5.4 provide
detailed information about inputs and outputs respectively.
Table 5.5: The control signal structure of PE
Control Signal Amount Functional Unit
control[3:0] 4 Arithmetic Unit
control[27:4] 24 Logical Operation Unit
control[35:28] 8 Table Lookup Unit
control[43:36] 8 Shifter/Rotator Unit
control[427:44] 384 Permutation/Expansion Unit
control[429:428] 2 Byte-wise rotator for AU
control[431:430] 2 Byte-wise rotator for LOU
control[433:432] 2 Byte-wise rotator for TLU
Each PE is configured using one 434-bit control signal; 4 bits for AU,
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24 bits for LOU, 8 bits for TLU, 8 bits for SRU, 384 bits for PEU, and 3x2 bits
for byte-wise rotators for AU, LOU, and TLU. The control signal structure of
a PE is summarized in Table 5.5.
We placed a small memory block dedicated to each PE to store the
required control signals. Even though we expect those signals to remain mostly
constant for a given algorithm, such system gives the flexibility of storing
multiple sets of control signals that can be easily controlled by state machine
of the processor. Each PE can hold up to four sets of control signals that are
loaded in the beginning and controlled by the central state machine.
The control interface of a PE is one 32-bit input for control load and a
7-bit control signal defined as follows;
PEcontrol = {WriteEnable ||State ||WordAddress} (5.3)
The control memory of a PE is loaded by 4B data chunks, and address
of each word is controlled by 2-bit State and 4-bitWordAddress. Throughout
the control loading process, the WriteEnable bit of PE state control signal
must be asserted. All other times control memory is in read-only mode. Load-
ing the control signals of a PE may take up to 56 cycles depending on the
amount of control signals needed to implement an algorithm. The control
structure and flexibility on addressing enable users to load only required PEs
and functional units; yielding decrease in setup time.
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5.7 Functional Units
Our processor design relies on five bypassable and independently con-
figurable functional unit structures that can work concurrently: Arithmetic
Unit (AU), Logical Operation Unit (LOU), Table Lookup Unit (TLU), Shifter-
Rotator Unit (SRU), and Permutation-Expansion Unit (PEU). The following
sections provide detailed information about the structure of each functional
unit.
5.7.1 Logical Operation Unit (LOU)
Our studies show that logical operators are the most commonly used
operations, and cryptographic algorithms tend to perform a sequence of log-
ical operations. More than 80 percent of existing cryptographic algorithms
perform two consecutive logical operations while 58.8% process three logical
operations back to back and 31.8% of the algorithms perform four or more
consecutive logical operations. That finding inspired us to separate logical op-
erations from the AU to support sequences of logical operations and to process
more operations concurrently, which enables us to achieve better utilization
of hardware while mapping the cryptographic algorithms and to get higher
throughput.
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Figure 5.4: The internal structure of LOU
The proposed LOU structure consists of three levels of operation re-
duction tree with six independently configurable logic blocks (CLBs) as shown
in Figure 5.4.
Each CLB is capable of performing four logic primitives (AND, OR,
NOT, and XOR) on its operands as well as applying bitwise inversion to any
operand (i.e. ¬A⊕B). Each CLB is configured by using one 4-bit control
signal. The TLU operates as detailed in Table 5.6.
The LOU takes six 4B inputs, two for each CLB in the first level,
produces one 4B output by applying an user-defined logical function and is
configured by a 24-bit control signal where;
LOUcontrol = {CLB5||CLB4||CLB3||CLB2||CLB1||CLB0} (5.4)
The proposed LOU can support all functions found in common cryp-
tographic hash functions and complex logic reduction functions with up to six
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Table 5.6: The Configurable Logic Block functionality
Control Signal Operation
0000 Forward operand #1 (A)
0001 Forward operand #1 (A)
0010 Forward operand #1 (A)
0011 Forward operand #1 (A)
0100 Forward operand #2 (B)
0101 Forward operand #2 (B)
0110 Forward operand #2 (B)
0111 Forward operand #2 (B)
1000 A ⊕ B
1001 A ∧ B
1010 A ∨ B
1011 ¬A
1100 ¬A ⊕ B
1101 ¬A ∧ B
1110 ¬A ∨ B
1111 ¬B
inputs. Let’s consider the following real life example:
F (X, Y, Z) = (X ∧ Y ) ∨ (X ∧ Z) ∨ (Y ∧ z) (5.5)
The Equation 5.5 is a 6-input function that is used in MD4, SHA-1, and
SHA-2. Such a simple function requires five iterations to produce the result
using a simple arithmetic logic unit. However, we can easily implement it in a
single cycle with the three-level reduction tree structure in our LOU. Besides
its functional capacity, the proposed LOU is also capable of forwarding one
output among any of its operands.
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5.7.2 Table Lookup Unit (TLU)
The table lookup operation is one of the most commonly used oper-
ations in cryptographic algorithms to provide non-linearity to ciphers. Our
studies on cryptographic algorithms show that table sizes and addressing
schemes greatly vary among algorithms. Since more than 70 percent of the
algorithms that use table lookup use tables with 256 entries, we use that
structure as a general trend. However, there are algorithms that require larger
tables. Our algorithm analysis shows that the largest table that is used in ex-
isting cryptographic algorithms has 1024 entries. Thus, our table lookup unit
structure mostly relies on 256-entry tables while supporting any table size up
to 1024-entry.
Figure 5.5: The internal structure of TLU
To support a wider range of cryptographic algorithms, three 256-entry
tables and one 1024-entry lookup table (named as SBOX and TBOX, respec-
tively) are included in each TLU as shown in Figure 5.5. The current TLU
67
structure offers three different ways of processing a table lookup: (i) one table
lookup with up to a 10-bit address that returns a 4B output, (ii) four table
lookups with each byte of a 4B input used as one address that returns four 4B
outputs, and (iii) one table lookup with each byte of a 4B input as addresses
that outputs each byte of one 4B output. Our TLU structure and its current
limitations are solely based on our analysis of studied algorithms; however,
larger lookup tables can be supported by splitting them into multiple tables,
and using multi-stage lookup operations.
Table 5.7: The Table Lookup Unit functionality
Control Signal Operation
control[0] TBOX write enable
control[1] SBOX #0 write enable
control[2] SBOX #1 write enable
control[3] SBOX #2 write enable
control[4] XOR level 1 enable
control[5] XOR level 2 enable
control[6] TBOX out / Merge 4 lookup
control[7] Table lookup enable
Our dataflow graph analysis suggests that in most cryptographic al-
gorithms, table lookup operations are preceded and/or followed by an XOR
operation. We include by-passable XOR operations before and after each mem-
ory lookup block as shown in Figure 5.5. Doing so enables us to implement
a sequence of XOR and SBOX lookup operations in one cycle while it a take
multiple cycles without such structure.
The current TLU structure takes four 4B inputs (one for writing data
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to tables, three for XOR and lookup operations) and generates up to four 4B
outputs, which enables one PE to process four parallel lookups. The TLU is
configured by using one 8-bit control signal and operates as summarized in
Table 5.7.
5.7.3 Arithmetic Unit (AU)
We describe the arithmetic operation class as integer addition and sub-
traction operations over varying lengths. Our analysis shows that more than
half of the algorithms uses arithmetic operations. While 73.1% of stream ci-
pher algorithms require arithmetic operations, they are also used in 42.7% of
block ciphers and 61.5% of cryptographic hash functions.
Figure 5.6: The internal structure of AU
We initially designed our AU as being capable of doing only 32-bit ad-
dition and subtraction. However, we later decided to extend our AU structure
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to support 8 and 16-bit operation granularities due to the high demand on
modular arithmetic operations in cryptographic algorithms (Figure 5.6). As
we mentioned in algorithm analysis chapter, 75.3% of modular arithmetic op-
erations in cryptographic algorithms use 232 as the base value, while more than
90% of modular arithmetic operations use either 28, 216, or 232 as base, which
can be realized by masking the result of standard integer arithmetic with an
AND operation. Thus, we provided the flexibility of performing operations in
modulo 28 and 216 within the current AU structure as well.
Table 5.8: The Arithmetic Unit functionality
Control Signal Operation
0000 Addition (32-bit)
0001 Addition in modulo 28
0010 Addition in modulo 216
0011 Forward the 1st operand
0100 Subtraction (32-bit)
0101 Subtraction in modulo 28
0110 Subtraction in modulo 216
0111 Forward the 2nd operand
1000 (A ⊕ B) + C in modulo 232
1001 A + (B ⊕ C) in modulo 232
1010 (Output of first level) ⊕ D in modulo 232
1011 (Output of first level) ⊕ D in modulo 232
1100 (A ⊕ B) - C in modulo 232
1101 A - (B ⊕ C) in modulo 232
1110 (Output of first level) ⊕ D in modulo 232
1111 (Output of first level) ⊕ D in modulo 232
Beside modular arithmetic support for modulo bases 28 and 216, we also
introduced XOR bundles before and after performing arithmetic operations.
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Our algorithm analysis suggests that a good fraction of algorithms use XOR
and arithmetic operations back to back. We also analyzed the timing, area,
and power overhead of these bundles and decided to integrate it into our AU
structure since it does not affect the critical path of our processor. Following
chapters provides more detailed information about or timing, area, and power
analysis. The current AU structure is configured by using one 4-bit control
signal and operates as detailed in Table 5.8.
5.7.4 Permutation/Expansion Unit (PEU)
Bit manipulation is used as the main operation in some cryptographic
algorithms like DES to provide non-linearity. The PEU provides a capability
of merging, manipulating, and expanding bits from two 4B inputs to generate
up to an 8B output or two 4B outputs. Even though it is possible to predefine
some bit manipulation schemes based on current cryptographic algorithms and
then select among them using control signals, we chose to provide full capa-
bility in our design to support not only existing algorithms but also potential
future algorithms. We believe that PEU will also help to support algorithms
that are not easily mapped onto our current design since bit manipulation can
implement complex logical operations very easily.
Each bit of the outputs is connected to an independently configurable
unit called Bit Selector (BS). Thus, PEU consists of 64 BS, each of which is
responsible for generating one particular bit of outputs. Each BS is configured
by using one 6-bit control signal. The BS operates as detailed in Table 5.9.
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Table 5.9: The Bit Selector control structure
Control Signal Selected Bit
000000 operandA[0]
000001 operandA[1]
000010 operandA[2]
. .
. .
000011 operandA[31]
100000 operandB[0]
100001 operandB[1]
. .
. .
111101 operandB[29]
111110 operandB[30]
111111 operandB[31]
The PEU takes two 4B inputs and produces two 4B outputs by manipu-
lating the bits of the inputs according to user-defined permutation. Since each
bit of two outputs may come from any bit of inputs, the PEU is configured by
using one 384-bit control signal where;
PEUcontrol = {BS63||BS62|| . . . ||BS2||BS1||BS0} (5.6)
5.7.5 Shifter/Rotator Unit (SRU)
The Shifter/Rotator Unit supports a variable amount shift/rotate op-
eration on 32-bit data for both ways. Since shift/rotation on 8 or 16-bit data
is not common among studied cryptographic algorithms, and it can be imple-
mented within PEU, smaller granularity rotations are not supported by this
unit.
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Figure 5.7: The internal structure of SRU
The SRU takes two 4B inputs, one as an operand and the other as
shift/rotate amount, and is controlled by one 8-bit control signal where;
LOUcontrol = {enOp2||ctrlOp2||ctrlSHFT ||enOp1||ctrlOp1} (5.7)
Our algorithm analysis suggests that more than 40% of algorithms using
shift/rotate operations also perform a logical operation before and/or after
shift/rotate operations. Thus, we introduced this flexibility into our SRU
structure, where user can specify logical operations (AND, OR, NOT, and
XOR) before and/or after shift/rotate operation (Figure 5.7).
Table 5.10: The Shifter/Rotator Unit functionality
Control Signal Operation
00 Left shift
01 Left rotate
10 Right shift
11 Right rotate
The shift/rotate functionality is controlled by 2-bit control signal and
operates as detailed in Table 5.10. Each operation block is controlled by 3-
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Table 5.11: The Operation Block functionality
Control Signal Operation
00 XOR
01 AND
10 OR
11 NOT
bit control signal (1 bit enable and 2 bits for operation configuration). The
functional configuration of the operation block is shown in Table 5.11.
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Chapter 6
Processor Analysis
In this chapter, we provide detailed timing, power, and area analysis of
our processor. We believe such detailed analysis on functional units might give
deeper insight about trade-offs between these metrics to both cryptographic
algorithm developers and hardware architects. We also analyzed the current
algorithm coverage of Cryptoraptor and its limitations.
6.1 Implementation
We have developed a highly modular fully configurable architecture in
Verilog HDL. Our parametrized architecture enables us to explore the design
space and study the trade-offs by changing the width and height of Execution
Tile, the number of PE rows that will fit into a pipeline stage, and even the
configuration of each functional units.
Synthesizing our RTL code into a gate level structure was done using
Synopsys Design Compiler (DC) and FreePDK45TM v1.4 45nm standard-cell
CMOS technology [202]. However, due to lack of a memory compiler, we used
register blocks to mimic the functionality of SBOX in TLU while analyzing
the maximum frequency of our design. We used "-uniquify", "-ungroup", and
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"-flatten" DC optimizations, which removed module boundaries and synthe-
sized the design as a whole block. Our processor design achieves a maximum
frequency of 1GHz, where each pipeline stage consists of one pair of a PE
row and Connection Row. More detailed timing analysis and discussions on
sub-modules are provided in following sections. We have not yet optimized
for frequency by introducing design-related optimizations to our datapath.
We leave further optimizations and design exploration as future work. Since
compiling memory blocks using registers requires unreasonably large area and
consumes high power, we used CACTI 6.5 Memory Model [153] to get more
accurate results for our memory blocks. To get more accurate estimate for
the overall die area and the power consumption of our processor, we combined
the results from DC and the memory blocks from CACTI with an additional
10% error to derive our results. The following sections provide more detailed
analysis and discussion on area requirements and differences between DC’s
and CACTI’s area results.
Even though we are not planning to use FPGA as the platform for our
processor, we also synthesized our RTL code to Xilinx Virtex-6 FPGA using
ISE Design Suite 14.6 without introducing any FPGA-related optimizations to
the system. The only thing that we had to change was the memory block used
in TLU as Block RAM blocks (BRAMs) in FPGA. Even though the FPGA
still can be reconfigured in real time when the algorithm is changed, we keep
our design the same to enable reconfigurability without having to recompile
FPGA. Despite the fact that the excessive use of multiplexers in our design
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has a negative impact on our cycle time on FPGA, we still managed to achieve
203.80MHz with the same configuration used in ASIC version.
6.2 Timing Analysis
We synthesized functional units in our PE separately to help determine
which functional unit or structure defines the critical path of our processor.
Such analysis also allows us to further improve the design of the functional
units which are not on the critical path.
Table 6.1: The cycle time of functional units in PE
Cycle time (ns) Cycle time withbyte-rotator (ns)
AU 0.51 0.56
LOU 0.48 0.53
TLU 0.58 0.63
SRU 0.55 -
PEU 0.23 -
Byte rotator 0.07 -
Multiplication 0.91 -
The cycle time of each functional unit in PE and their combined ver-
sions with byte rotator are summarized in Table 6.1. Due to its memory opera-
tions and complex structure, TLU is the critical path in our PE design. Since
we cannot make the PE faster than the slowest component, we augmented
the functionalities of other functional unit; yielding higher compute capabili-
ties. As we described in previous chapters, we bundled arithmetic operations
with XOR and shift/rotate operations with logical operation blocks. Table 6.2
summarizes the effects of these bundles on the cycle time our functional units.
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Table 6.2: The cycle time comparison of functional units with bundles
Cycle time (ns) Cycle time withbyte-shifter (ns)
AU 0.42 0.46
AU (bundled) 0.51 0.56
SRU 0.30 -
SRU (bundled) 0.55 -
Considering one-fourth of the algorithms use byte-wise rotations, inte-
grating byte rotators to AU, LOU, and TLU has an insignificant effect (0.04-
0.05ns when merged) on overall cycle time. As shown in Table 6.1, a single
stage multiplication unit takes 0.91ns to multiply two 32-bit integer, which
would significantly increase the cycle time of PE; yielding lower clock frequency
for the processor. Our algorithm analysis shows that supporting multiplica-
tion would increase the algorithm coverage by 8.1 percent, but results in 25%
decrease in clock frequency. Thus, we chose not to include multiplication in
our current datapath, yielding 0.65ns cycle time for our PE structure.
Table 6.3 shows the cycle times required for each sub-structure in our
processor as well as overall cycle time of Cyrptoraptor. As we discussed before,
a full crossbar structure between levels has a significant impact on the cycle
time of our processor. The functional part of a full row accounts for only
two third of the overall cycle time. Even though one full row, which is a
merged version of one PE and Connection row, requires 0.95ns, the register
file connections and capacitance effects of all connections yields us to have
1.00ns as the cycle time of our processor.
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Table 6.3: The cycle time of sub-modules in Cryptoraptor
Cycle time (ns)
PE 0.63
PE Row 0.63
Connection Row 0.47
Pipeline Register 0.09
One Full Row 0.95
Execute Tile 1.00
Cryptoraptor 1.00
Such a detailed analysis also shows the affect of synthesizing modules
with "-uniquify", "-ungroup", and "-flatten" optimizations. These optimizations
allow DC to flat out all design, remove module boundaries, and synthesize it
as a whole block. Thus, it makes impossible to predict the cycle time of larger
modules by just combining the cycle time of smaller ones. We will discuss
similar affects on area and power analysis in later sections.
6.3 Area Analysis
We analyzed area requirements of each functional unit and sub-modules
in our processor. Even though we used registers while doing timing analysis,
we used the CACTI 6.5 Memory Model [153] to get more accurate area anal-
ysis because compiling memory blocks using registers requires unreasonably
large area, resulting in misleading information. Table 6.4 shows the difference
between compiling memory blocks with DC and CACTI.
Ideally, the memory blocks should be compiled using Memory Compiler
and integrated into DC. However, we tried to estimate the area requirements
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Table 6.4: The area comparison between Design Compiler and CACTI
Entry size Design Compiler(mm2) CACTI (mm
2) Ratio
SBOX 256 0.1582 0.0017 93.0
TBOX 1024 0.5731 0.0031 184.8
as accurate as possible by using CACTI.
Table 6.5: The area of functional units in PE
Area (mm2)
Area with
byte-rotator
(mm2)
AU 0.0107 0.0117
LOU 0.0080 0.0087
TLU 0.0110 0.0115
SRU 0.0093 -
PEU 0.0156 -
Byte rotator 0.0011 -
Multiplication 0.0075 -
Table 6.5 shows the area requirements of each functional unit in PE
and their combined versions with byte rotators. As opposed to discussion that
we did for timing analysis, the functional unit that has the largest area re-
quirement is PEU instead of TLU. On the other hand, Table 6.6 summarizes
the effects of our bundles (arithmetic operations with XOR, and shift/rotate
operations with logical operation blocks) on the area requirements of AU and
SRU. Even though the improved functionality increases the area, we concen-
trate more on performance and flexibility for this thesis.
As seen in Table 6.5, merging functional units with byte rotator does
not have a significant impact on the overall die area. Unlike its effects on
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Table 6.6: The area comparison of functional units with bundles
Area (mm2)
Area with
byte-shifter
(mm2)
AU 0.0035 0.0042
AU (bundled) 0.0107 0.0117
SRU 0.0063 -
SRU (bundled) 0.0093 -
cycle time, a multiplication unit does not have a serious impact on the area.
However, since our main aim is to design a "high performance" cryptographic
processor, its effects on cycle time are the determining cause for not having a
multiplication unit in our datapath.
Table 6.7: The area of sub-modules in Cryptoraptor
Area (mm2)
PE 0.0344
PE Row 0.1448
Connection Row 0.0627
Pipeline Register 0.0221
One Full Row 0.2115
Execute Tile 4.5428
Register File 1.7816
Cryptoraptor 6.3244
The area requirements of each sub-structure in our processor, as well
as overall cycle time of Cyrptoraptor, are summarized in Table 6.7. The func-
tional and execution parts of our processor use 71.8 percent of overall die area.
With a 256-entry register file (1.78mm2), Cryptoraptor requires only 6.32mm2,
which is approximately 34X and 78X smaller than existing CPUs and GPUs,
respectively.
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6.4 Power Analysis
Since comparing the power usage of our processor with AES-specific
cores or existing GPPs would be unfair, we provide detailed analysis for each
functional unit instead. Besides fairness, providing such comparison is quite
hard, if not impossible, due to the lack of data provided by chip vendors and
in research papers.
We believe that a detailed analysis on power usage of functional units
may give more insight to cryptographic algorithm developers about hardware
implementation of their algorithms. Combination of timing, area, and power
analysis enables both cryptographic algorithm developers to optimize their
designs in the light of these trade-offs and hardware designers to choose more
appropriate hardware structures while implementing the algorithms.
Table 6.8: The power usage comparison for memory blocks
Internal
Power
(mW )
Switching
Power
(mW )
Leakage
Power
(mW )
Dynamic
Power
(mW )
SBOX (DC) 260.4114 7.6365 0.83 268.8782
SBOX (CACTI) 11.62 3.48x10−6 0.15 11.77
TBOX (DC) 774.8735 20.2947 3.03 798.2086
TBOX (CACTI) 14.41 1.31x10−5 0.18 14.59
While providing power dissipations, we applied the same strategy that
we did for the area in the previous section. Thus, we combined the power
usage of functional parts from DC and memory blocks from CACTI with an
additional 10% for error to derive power usage of our functional units, sub-
modules, and our processor. The power usage difference for memory blocks
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synthesized using DC and CACTI is summarized in Table 6.8.
Table 6.9: The power usage of functional units in PE
Internal
Power
(mW )
Switching
Power
(mW )
Leakage
Power
(mW )
Dynamic
Power
(mW )
AU 3.97 3.07 0.0479 7.08
LOU 2.49 2.30 0.0269 4.81
TLU 51.54 1.35 0.0399 53.55
SRU 1.90 1.84 0.0303 3.78
PEU 14.35 4.07 0.0748 18.50
AU (with BR) 4.06 3.22 0.0513 7.33
LOU (with BR) 2.62 2.41 0.0282 5.06
TLU (with BR) 51.75 1.48 0.0427 53.89
Byte rotator 0.58 0.52 0.0021 1.10
Multiplication 4.09 3.06 0.0374 7.18
Synopsys Design Compiler divides the power dissipated in a design
into four categories: leakage, dynamic, internal, and switching. The leak-
age (static) power is the power consumed by a gate when it is not switching,
and caused by currents that flow through the transistors even when they are
turned off. Dynamic power is the power dissipated when the circuit is ac-
tive i.e. performing some function. Dynamic power consists of internal and
switching components. Internal power is consumed within a cell for charging
and discharging internal cell capacitances, while switching power is dissipated
when charging and discharging the load capacitance at the cell output.
Table 6.9 provides a detailed power usage analysis of each functional
unit in PE and their combined versions with byte rotator. Our power analysis
provides not only total dynamic power per functional unit, but also internal,
switching, and leakage powers separately. As shown in Table 6.9, TLU requires
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Table 6.10: The power usage comparison of functional units with bundles
Internal
Power
(mW )
Switching
Power
(mW )
Leakage
Power
(mW )
Dynamic
Power
(mW )
AU 1.23 0.87 0.0147 2.12
AU (bundled) 3.97 3.07 0.0479 7.08
SRU 1.86 1.82 0.0220 3.71
SRU (bundled) 1.90 1.84 0.0303 3.78
the highest dynamic power by far with 53.5mW due to its memory blocks.
However, there is also a huge gap between the power usage of PEU and other
functional units. This finding clearly shows the trade-off between the flexibility
and power usage. We also analyzed the effects of our bundled operations to the
power usage of our functional units. Table 6.10 provides a detailed analysis on
the effects of these bundles on the power usage. Even though it seems like the
bundled arithmetic and XOR operation structure has a great impact on power
usage of AU, it is negligible compared to the power usage of other functional
units and the overall system.
Table 6.11: The power usage of modules in Cryptoraptor
Internal
Power
(mW )
Switching
Power
(mW )
Leakage
Power
(mW )
Dynamic
Power
(mW )
PE 63.42 4.21 0.15 68.40
PE Row 254.37 18.35 0.60 277.17
Connection Row 1.58 0.86 0.17 2.60
Pipeline Register 288.74 3.71 1.20x10−7 292.57
One Full Row 336.20 19.35 0.96 360.37
Execute Tile 5229.32 303.75 19.96 5602.65
Register File 573.49 4.68x10−5 3.40 576.89
Cryptoraptor 5802.80 303.75 19.96 6207.04
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The detailed power usage of each sub-structure in our processor are
summarized in Table 6.11. Our studies shows that CR between levels does not
have significant impact on power usage of the processor and majority of total
power is used by the functional parts of our processor. We realized that DC
and optimization flags make power usage unpredictable and more complicated
than a simple calculation of combining sub-modules. For example; one PE
row, CR, and pipeline registers require 277.17mW , 2.60mW , and 292.57mW
dynamic power respectively when they are synthesized separately. However,
DC reports 360.37mW dynamic power usage for one Full Row (which consists
of one pair of a PE row and CR with pipeline registers), where only 119.39mW
is attributed to pipeline registers.
Table 6.12: Power usage comparison of GPPs
Lith.
(nm)
Area
(mm2)
Max
Power
(W )
Power
per area
(W/mm2)
Core i7-2600K 32nm 216 95 0.4398
Core i7-980X 32nm 239 130 0.5439
VIA C7 90nm 30 20 0.6666
GTX 260 55nm 576 182 0.3159
GTX 285 55nm 490 204 0.4163
GTX 295 55nm 470 289 0.6148
Tesla C2050 40nm 539 238 0.4415
Cryptoraptor 45nm 6.32 6207.04 0.9777
Even though we avoid to compare the power consumption of our pro-
cessor with existing GPPs, we would like to analyze power per area (W/mm2)
metric of our processor (shown in Table 6.12). In previous chapters, we men-
tioned that a large fraction of energy dissipation can be attributed to the
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instruction supply in an in-order RISC machine [92]. Table 6.11 shows that
90.6 percent of total power is consumed by functional and execution part of
our processor. Therefore, we can state that using a compact finite state ma-
chine representation for control flow in algorithms increase energy efficiency
by simplifying the front-end structure of a traditional processor. We can also
improve this idea by claiming such control mechanism reduces not only the
energy consumption but also area requirements of the processor.
6.5 Performance Analysis
Since we are unique in supporting a wide range of cryptographic al-
gorithms on a single cryptographic processor, there is no directly comparable
related work. As discussed earlier, most of the existing solutions are hard-
coded and hand-tuned, usually not even parameterized, for a particular cryp-
tographic algorithm.
Even though we aim to achieve high throughput for all algorithms, we
can only compare our performance on AES due to the lack of published results
for any other algorithm. The main purpose of our performance comparisons
is not to show that we achieve the highest throughput but to emphasize that
our proposed architecture has competitive performance results compared to
existing solutions. However, we should re-emphasize that we compare our
flexible processor against to the designs that are hand-tuned and specialized
specifically for AES.
The one of the biggest challenges on performance analysis is the per-
86
formance data provided by chip vendors and in research papers. Hardly any
company provides detailed performance data nor an insight into the archi-
tecture itself such as chip architecture and pipeline depth. The performance
numbers and architecture descriptions are not complete, even in resesearch
papers; making comparisons even harder.
Another obstacle for having a fair comparison is the selection of base
settings for AES. Our literature study on AES shows that there is no unifor-
mity among research papers while presenting the performance results. The
first challenge is to find a base performance metric to compare a variety of
solutions effectively. Among many other alternatives used in literature such as
bytes per cycle and bytes per area, we choose our throughput metric as gigabit
per second (Gbps) to incorporate characteristic of the algorithm (block size),
hardware design performance (frequency), and hardware design architecture
(latency) into a single metric. We studied each proposed solution in detail to
generate their throughput metrics as Gbps if they have not presented in that
form.
Our initial studies also indicate that there is no agreed mode of opera-
tion in the literature to study the performance of AES solutions. The choice of
feedback (CBC, CFB, and OFB) or non-feedback (ECB and CTR) operation
mode plays a crucial role on throughput of the design. In general, AES cores
are designed to achieve high throughput on non-feedback modes with a deep
pipeline structure and have a dramatic decrease in performance on feedback
modes.
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Even though we believe that feedback mode throughput of an AES core
provides a better insight about the performance of a design, we find it unfair to
normalize the performance results of a core optimized for non-feedback mode
to feedback ones. For that reason, we present throughput of existing solutions
for both as well as their clock frequencies, lithographies, and pipeline depths.
We prefer not to scale the presented results to a particular technology or
device to avoid unrealistic advantages/disadvantages created by mathematical
formulas used in [132] and [126]. A comprehensive comparison of the state-of-
the-art hardware implementations of AES is summarized in Tables 6.13, 6.14,
and 6.15 for ASIC, FPGA, and GPP solutions, respectively.
Table 6.13: AES Performance comparison of ASIC solutions
Lith.
(nm)
Parallel
Stream
# of
Cycles
Freq.
(MHz)
CBC
Through-
put
(Gbps)
CTR
Through-
put
(Gbps)
Saravanan [187] 180nm 1 80 333.0 0.53 10.66
Amphion [7] 180nm 1 1 200.0 25.60 25.60
EnSilica eSi-8110 [69] 65nm 1 11 500.0 5.82 64.00
Mathew [139] 45nm 4 20 2615.0 16.74 66.94
Hodjat [99] 180nm 1 41 606.0 1.89 77.57
Swankoski [205] 160nm 1 50 680.3 1.74 87.07
Ip Cores, Inc [105] 90nm 1 10 824.0 10.55 105.47
Morioka [151] 130nm 1 10 909.0 11.64 116.35
Ali [5] 180nm 1 21 1015.0 6.19 129.92
Liu [132] 65nm 1 152 1210.0 1.02 153.70
Our processor 45nm 1 20 1000.0 6.40 128.00
Table 6.13 shows that an ASIC implementation of our cryptographic
processor achieves a competitive throughput result compared to AES-specific
ASIC cores. With its outer-round pipelined structure and highly tuned data-
path, Morioka’s AES-only implementation [151] on an old 130nm technology
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achieves a high throughput on both AES-CBC and AES-CTR, 11.64Gbps and
116.35Gbps respectively. Besides its reconfigurability, our processor achieves
peak AES throughputs of 6.40Gbps and 128Gbps, respectively. Since the num-
ber of pipeline stages has a negative impact on CBC throughput, our through-
put is roughly half of Morioka’s.
With its higher frequency, 152 pipeline stages, and its many core struc-
ture, Liu’s AES processor [132] achieves the highest AES-128-CTR throughput
of 154.88Gbps. Due to its very deep pipeline, however, it is not able to pro-
vide high performance on feedback modes. Liu’s AES processor (6.63mm2)
only supports AES while our processor (6.32mm2) is capable of supporting a
wide range of algorithms. Our processor design achieves similar throughput
per area as Liu’s many core solution, 20.25Gbps/mm2 and 23.18Gbps/mm2
respectively.
Amphion’s high performance AES core [7] running at 200MHz achieves
the highest AES-CBC throughput by processing ten rounds in a single cycle.
Even though its internal structure is not publicly available, it is obvious that
the core cannot achieve a high CBC throughput due its low clock frequency.
The 10-stage pipelined 824MHz AES core on 90nm technology introduced
by Ip Cores presents a balanced performance on both CBC and CTR mode.
Both designs clearly show the importance of the balance between the pipeline
depth and the clock frequency. Even though we are slower then the highest
throughput AES-specific ASIC cores, our highly configurable cryptographic
processor is competitive to them.
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Table 6.14: AES Performance comparison of FPGA solutions
FPGA Family Lith.(nm)
Num.
of Cy-
cles
Freq.
(MHz)
CBC
Through-
put
(Gbps)
CTR
Through-
put
(Gbps)
Jarvinen [109] Virtex 2 130nm 41 139.10 0.43 17.80
Swankoski [204] Virtex 2 130nm 10 147.00 1.88 18.82
Hodjat [100] Virtex 2 130nm 41 168.30 0.53 21.54
Zhang [228] Virtex 1 130nm 70 168.40 0.31 21.56
Good [87] Spartan 3 90nm 70 196.10 0.36 25.10
Iyer [107] Virtex 2 130nm 50 206.84 0.53 26.48
Good [86] Virtex 2 130nm 240 222.90 0.12 28.53
Rizk [181] Virtex 4 90nm 20 223.00 1.43 28.54
Yoo [227] Virtex 2 130nm 30 232.60 0.99 29.77
Good [86] Virtex 3 90nm 120 240.90 0.26 30.84
Fan [70] Virtex 2 90nm 50 250.00 0.64 32.00
EnSilica [69] Virtex 6 40nm 11 275.00 3.20 35.20
Ali [5] Stratix II GX 180nm 21 282.50 1.72 36.16
Wang [212] Virtex 6 40nm 66 344.12 0.67 44.05
Mercoratech [145] Virtex 6 40nm 10 357.00 4.57 45.70
Deshpande [186] Spartan 6 45nm 80 430.00 0.69 55.04
Hossain [102] Stratix II GX 90nm 23 450.05 2.50 57.61
Swankoski [205] Virtex 4 90nm 50 519.18 1.33 66.46
Soliman [198, 199] Virtex 5 65nm 40 557.00 1.78 71.30
Qu [171] Virtex 5 65nm 10 576.07 7.37 73.74
Chen [49] Virtex 4 90nm 10 645.70 8.26 82.65
Our processor Virtex 6 40nm 20 203.80 1.30 26.09
There exists a rich literature on high performance AES hardware ar-
chitectures targeting FPGAs as summarized in Table 6.14. The AES core
proposed by Chen [49] adapts outer-round pipelining scheme and is stated
to achieve a very high frequency of 645.70MHz on a Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGA,
producing the highest AES-CTR throughput of 82.65Gbps. We tried to repli-
cate the work using the source code provided by authors and synthesized
to same FPGA family with the highest speed grade with all optimizations
on, using ISE Design Suite 14.6. However, the highest clock frequency that
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we were able to produce was 284.43MHz, yielding 36.41Gbps as opposed to
82.65Gbps. Similarly, 10-staged AES core reported by Qu [171] claims an as-
toundingly high clock frequency of 576.07MHz on Virtex-5 while Soliman’s
solution [199] achieves 557MHz clock frequency on the same FPGA even with
its deep inner-round pipelined structure.
Table 6.15: AES Performance comparison of GPP solutions
Architecture Lith.(nm)
Config.
(core/warp
x thread)
Freq.
(MHz)
Through-
put
(Gbps)
Area
(mm2)
Through-
put per
area
(Gbps/mm2)
Nishikawa [158] Core i7-2600K 32nm 1 x 1 3400 1.90 216 0.009
Nishikawa [158] Core i7-2600K 32nm 4 x 8 3400 7.50 216 0.035
Nishikawa [158] Core i7-2600K 32nm 1 x 1 3400 25.10 216 0.116
Nishikawa [158] Core i7-2600K 32nm 4 x 4 3400 44.20 216 0.205
Akdemir [4] Core i7-980X 32nm 1 x 1 3300 6.30 239 0.026
Akdemir [4] Core i7-980X 32nm 6 x 12 3300 72.30 239 0.303
VIA Tech. [211] VIA C7 90nm 1 x 1 2000 25.00 30 0.833
Zola [161] GTX 260 55nm 27 x 256 1242 30.00 576 0.052
Iwai [106] GTX 285 55nm 60 x 512 1500 35.20 490 0.072
Nishikawa [158] GTX 285 55nm 60 x 512 1242 35.20 490 0.072
Nishikawa [158] Tesla C2050 40nm 28 x 512 1150 48.60 539 0.090
Bos [16] GTX 295 55nm 120 x 512 1240 59.60 470 0.127
Our processor ASIC 45nm 1 x 1 1000 128.00 6.32 20.253
On the other hand, even commercial high performance AES cores in-
troduced by EnSilica [69] and Mercoratech [145] achieve significantly lower
clock frequencies on a faster FPGA family with the same number of pipeline
stages. Table 6.14 clearly shows the impact of the number of pipeline stages on
AES-CTR throughput. Despite their higher frequency, while most of the AES
cores targeted FPGA has poor performance in feedback mode, they achieve
very high throughput on non-feedback mode due to their deep pipelines rang-
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ing from 40 to 240 stages. The performance results of FPGA solutions suggest
that outer-round pipelined architecture yields better overall performance for
AES by balancing the pipeline depth and the clock frequency of the architec-
ture. Because our design is tuned for an ASIC implementation, it contains an
aggressive connection network and excessive use of multiplexers. Even though
it only runs at 203.8MHz it still achieves reasonable throughput of 1.30Gpbs
AES-CBC and 27.31Gbps.
Table 6.16: Performance summary of algorithms on Cryptoraptor
Parallel
Stream
# of
Round
Block
size
(bits)
# of
Cycles
CBC
Throughput
(Gbps)
CTR
Throughput
(Gbps)
Blowfish 4 16 64 48 5.33 85.33
Camellia 2 16 128 73 3.51 64.00
CAST-128 4 16 64 80 3.20 64.00
DES 2 16 64 48 2.67 42.67
GOST 4 32 64 98 2.61 51.20
Kasumi 1 6 64 64 1.00 16.00
RC5 4 12 64 48 5.33 85.33
SEED 4 16 128 152 0.84 16.00
Twofish 2 16 128 80 3.20 64.00
RC4 4 4 32 32 4.00 -
Phelix 2 1 32 10 6.40 -
MD4 2 48 128 144 1.78 -
MD5 2 64 512 254 4.03 -
SHA-1 4 80 512 225 4.55 -
SHA-2 1 64 512 320 1.60 -
With their highly parallel structures and very high clock frequencies,
current generation CPU and GPU solutions also generate very competitive
throughput results up to 72.30Gbps and 59.60Gbps respectively. It is apparent
that increasing number of threads allow to hide pipeline latency in GPPs,
yielding very high throughputs. However, current generation GPPs require
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a very large chip footprint up to 539mm2. Even though we haven’t put any
effort to minimize the required area of our processor, we achieve one to three
order of magnitude higher throughput per area than commercial GPPs as
shown in Table 6.15. We couldn’t present a similar analysis for AES cores
targeting ASIC and FPGA due to missing or inconsistent area constraints in
the reference papers.
As we mentioned earlier, there are not many studies in the literature
on hardware implementation of other algorithms that we mapped. For that
reason, we are unable to provide such a comparison. However, the performance
of other algorithms on our processor is summarized in Table 6.16.
6.6 Resource Utilization
To provide a high degree of flexibility, we introduced some redundant
operations, units, and connections in our processor. Therefore, not all algo-
rithms can utilize all available resources in Crytoraptor. Table 6.17 summarizes
the resource utilization of the algorithms that we mapped onto Cryptoraptor,
and Table 6.18 compares the resource utilization of our manual mapping and
toolchain. The following chapter discusses the reasons of this difference. The
utilization analysis includes only functional units and PEs that are processing
some operations; thus, operand forwarding is not included in resource utiliza-
tion.
Our analysis shows that, even though the average PE utilization is
pretty high, utilization of individual FUs is significantly low on both manual
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Table 6.17: Resource utilization summary of mapped algorithms on Cryptoraptor
Parallel
Stream LOU TLU AU SRU PEU PE
Way
per
Stream
Max.
Con-
nection
AES 1 50% 0% 50% 0% 0% 100% 4 4
Blowfish 4 33% 67% 33% 0% 0% 100% 1 1
Camellia 2 71% 0% 25% 3% 0% 71% 2 2
CAST-128 4 6% 54% 20% 20% 0% 100% 1 1
DES 2 0% 0% 33% 0% 50% 83% 2 2
GOST 4 34% 33% 33% 33% 0% 100% 1 1
Kasumi 1 25% 9% 20% 0% 5% 48% 4 4
RC5 4 0% 50% 0% 50% 0% 100% 1 1
SEED 1 14% 8% 32% 0% 0% 50% 4 4
Twofish 2 21% 40% 40% 20% 0% 81% 2 2
RC4 4 0% 38% 50% 0% 0% 100% 1 1
Phelix 2 0% 70% 0% 80% 20% 100% 2 2
MD4 2 22% 50% 0% 17% 0% 73% 2 1
MD5 2 19% 63% 0% 13% 0% 85% 2 1
SHA-1 2 18% 75% 0% 28% 0% 99% 2 2
SHA-2 1 25% 35% 0% 30% 0% 50% 3 3
Average 2.38 21% 37% 21% 18% 5% 84% 2 2
Table 6.18: Resource utilization summary of mapped algorithms on Cryptoraptor
Manual mapping Automated mapping
LOU TLU AU SRU PEU PE LOU TLU AU SRU PEU PE
AES 50% 0% 50% 0% 0% 100% 50% 0% 50% 0% 0% 100%
Blowfish 0% 67% 33% 0% 0% 100% 33% 67% 33% 0% 0% 100%
Camellia 80% 0% 20% 3% 0% 60% 71% 0% 25% 3% 0% 71%
CAST128 6% 54% 20% 20% 0% 100% 6% 54% 20% 20% 0% 100%
DES 0% 0% 17% 0% 50% 50% 0% 0% 33% 0% 50% 83%
GOST 34% 33% 33% 33% 0% 100% 34% 33% 33% 33% 0% 100%
Kasumi 25% 0% 20% 9% 5% 50% 25% 9% 20% 0% 5% 48%
RC5 0% 50% 0% 50% 0% 100% 0% 50% 0% 50% 0% 100%
SEED 13% 8% 30% 0% 0% 50% 14% 8% 32% 0% 0% 50%
Twofish 20% 40% 30% 20% 0% 90% 21% 40% 40% 20% 0% 81%
RC4 0% 38% 50% 0% 0% 100% 0% 38% 50% 0% 0% 100%
Phelix 0% 70% 0% 80% 20% 100% 0% 70% 0% 80% 20% 100%
MD4 17% 50% 0% 17% 0% 66% 22% 50% 0% 17% 0% 73%
MD5 12% 50% 0% 12% 0% 62% 19% 63% 0% 13% 0% 85%
SHA-1 17% 83% 0% 33% 0% 100% 18% 75% 0% 28% 0% 99%
SHA-2 20% 40% 0% 30% 0% 55% 25% 35% 0% 30% 0% 50%
Average: 18% 36% 19% 18% 5% 80% 21% 37% 21% 18% 5% 84%
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and automated mappings. The redundancy that we added for the flexibility
and the unpredictability of future algorithms increase area and power con-
sumption significantly. The average utilization of FUs and PE is summarized
in Figure 6.1 with minimum, maximum values as well as 25% and 75% distri-
butions around the median.
Figure 6.1: The utilization summary
6.7 Current Algorithm Coverage
With the proposed cryptographic processor, we aim to support a wide
range of existing cryptographic algorithms and future standards. Therefore,
it is important to analyze the ratio of algorithms that can be supported by
our processor. Table 6.19 summarizes the current algorithm coverage of our
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processor. Even though we did not implement all algorithms due to excessive
amount of time required to do so, our initial studies show that 86.5 percent
of the algorithms that we analyzed is supported by current structure of our
processor while 13.5% require additional hardware or logic to be supported.
Table 6.19: The current coverage of cryptographic algorithms
Requires
additional logic
to be supported
Supported by
current
structure
Block Ciphers 15.6% 84.4%
Stream Ciphers 3.8% 96.2%
Hash Functions 15.4% 84.6%
All 13.5% 86.5%
We also analyzed the reason behind not being able to support all ex-
isting algorithms with the current structure. Our analysis shows that the lack
of modular arithmetic support for arbitrary choice of modulus and the lack
of dedicated multiplication units prevent us to support all algorithms. The
impact of modular arithmetic and multiplication support on the algorithm
coverage is illustrated in Figure 6.2. Our initial studies show that there are a
few algorithms requiring both modular arithmetic and multiplication in their
datapath. Therefore, extending the current structure with modular arith-
metic or multiplication will not enable us to cover all algorithms. However,
multiplication unit can be a good candidate for next hardware improvement
since it will increase the algorithm coverage by 8.1%. To support all existing
algorithms, we need to add multiplication operation as a functionality and
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Block Ciphers Stream Ciphers Hash Functions All
Not supported (Mod&Mult) 4.2% 0.0% 7.7% 4.1%
Not supported (Mod only) 2.1% 0.0% 3.8% 2.0%
Not supported (Mult only) 9.4% 3.8% 3.8% 7.4%
Supported 84.4% 96.2% 84.6% 86.5%
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Figure 6.2: The distribution of supported and non-supported algorithms based
on limitations
integrate the flexibility of supporting any value of modular base to our AU
structure.
6.8 Limitations
One of the main limitation of our current design is the lack of dedi-
cated multiplication unit which might be useful for some crypto-systems such
as IDEA and RC6. However, only 17 out of 148 cryptographic algorithms (13
block ciphers, 1 stream cipher, and 3 cryptographic hash functions) require
multiplication. Despite the fact that the number of algorithms using multi-
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plication is very limited, and multiplication can be realized with a set of shift
operations and a sequence of additions, having a dedicated multiplication unit
may speed up the algorithms that are heavily depending on multiplication and
increase the flexibility of our processor for future algorithms.
Even though the most of the modular arithmetic operations can be
implemented using existing functional units, current processor design can be
extended to support varying and unorthodox modulo bases. Extending exist-
ing hardware for modular arithmetic may increase the algorithm coverage of
our processor by 2 percent while having both multiplication unit and modular
arithmetic support may increase up to 13.5 percent.
The other major limitation is limited addressing structure of our TLU.
As we mentioned earlier, TLU is capable of processing one lookup with up to
10-bit addressing or four parallel 8-bit lookup. We designed our parallel lookup
structure and the upper limit for addressing by solely analyzing existing algo-
rithms. Since it is impossible to predict the requirements of future standards
in advance, this structure and limitations may or may not block efficient imple-
mentation of future algorithms. Whereas, we believe that our highly flexible
Connection Row structure and PEU will ease the implementation of any al-
gorithm that does not easily fit into current table lookup limitations. In fact,
table lookup operation with more than 10-bit addressing can be implemented
by separating the table manually or with the help of a tool, and applying a
sequence of lookup operations instead. However, providing a better flexibility
within TLU may allow us to achieve high performance even on algorithms with
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higher requirements. We leave further study on improving existing TLU and
other functional units as future work.
Due to our initial target application set for our processor, public key
encryption and elliptic curve cryptography are beyond the scope of this work.
We believe that after solving current limitations of our design, we may
have a complete, flexible and high throughput cryptographic processor that can
support a wide range, if not all, of symmetric key encryption algorithms and
cryptographic hash functions, and ideally public key cryptography as well.
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Chapter 7
Cryptographic Algorithm Mapping
We mapped a total of 16 block ciphers, stream ciphers and crypto-
graphic hash functions to verify its flexibility and reconfigurability of our
cryptographic processor. During mapping process, we focused on encryption
only for each algorithm with the configurations widely used in literature or
suggested by their designers.
As we did for our algorithm analysis phase, we focused on selecting algo-
rithms based on widely used security protocols (IPsec, TLS/SSL, WTLS, SSH,
S/MIME and OpenPGP) and cryptographic libraries (OpenSSL and GNU
Crypto). We also mapped some algorithms that are not in existing protocols
and libraries to stress the flexibility of Cryptoraptor. The list of algorithms
that we mapped, the security protocols and cryptographic libraries that they
are included, and the rationale behind including these 16 algorithms in the
mapping process can be found in Table 7.1.
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Table 7.1: Algorithm summary and selection for mapping process
Security
Protocols
Cryptographic
Libraries Speciality
AES [156] Almost all Almost all Most widely used algorithm, stresses maximumparallel lookup table
Blowfish [188] IPsec OpenSSL Base structure for some block ciphers, exampleArithmetic-XOR pattern
Camellia [10] IPsec, TLS
Crypto++,
Cryptospecs,
OpenSSL
Example algorithm that requires special atten-
tion to achieve high performance, example byte-
wise rotator
CAST-128 [2] IPsec, PGP
Crypto++,
Cryptospecs,
OpenSSL,
GnuPG
Base structure for some block ciphers, example
changing round structures, and Arithmetic-XOR
pattern
DES [1] IPsec, SSL, TLS Almost all Example bit permutation and unorthodox oper-ation width
GOST [169] - Crypto++,Cryptospecs Doesn’t fit well, example Shift-Logic pattern
Kasumi [141]
as A5/3 in
UMTS, GSM,
GPRS
Cryptospecs
Data dependent and fairly complex structure
due to its unbalanced rounds and unorthodox
table sizes (7 and 9-bit addressing)
RC5 [178] S/MIME
Crypto++,
Cryptospecs,
OpenSSL
Good on software, doesn’t fit well in Cryptorap-
tor
SEED [128]
CMS, IPsec,
SSL, S/MIME,
TLS
Crypto++,
Cryptospecs,
OpenSSL
Recursive round structure, example algorithm
that requires special attention to achieve high
performance
Twofish [189] OpenPGP GnuPG Complex structure and example operation pat-terns
RC4 [213] TLS, WEP,WPA
Crypto++,
GnuPG,
Cryptospecs,
OpenSSL
Most widely used stream cipher, table updates,
register file usage
Phelix [217] - - Very complex structure, use of patterns
MD4 [176] PGP, S/MIME
Crypto++,
Cryptospecs,
OpenSSL
Base structure for several hash functions,
stresses LOU structure, changing round struc-
tures
MD5 [175]
IPsec, NTLM,
SSL, S/MIME,
TLS
Almost all
Base structure for several hash functions,
stresses LOU structure, changing round struc-
tures
SHA-1 [64]
IPsec, PGP,
SSH, SSL,
S/MIME, TLS
Almost all Most widely used hash function, changing roundstructures
SHA-2 [74]
Bitcoin, IPsec,
PGP, SSH, SSL,
S/MIME, TLS
Almost all Complex round structure, replacing SHA-1
To enable easier implementation, more efficient and optimized algo-
rithm mapping, and higher throughput, a simple cryptography assembly lan-
guage is introduced (Table 7.2). Besides operation primitives, the proposed
language allows users to define and use variables, arrays, tables, constants,
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and permutation tables. Instructions operate on 32-bit immediate values as
well. Since the multiplication and modular arithmetic with an arbitrary mod-
ulus are currently not supported, they are not included in the language. We
also implemented a custom toolchain which is fully aware of the underlying
processor architecture and optimizes the input mapping for high throughput.
Table 7.2: Instruction List
Operation Class Instructions
AU
ADD, ADD8, ADD16, ADDi, ADD8i,
ADD16i, SUB, SUB8, SUB16, SUBi, SUB8i,
SUB16i
LOU AND, OR, XOR, NOT, ANDi, ORi, XORi
TLU SBOX, SBOX_M, SBOX_P, STR
SRU SHR, SHL, SHRi, SHLi, ROTR, ROTL,ROTRi, ROTLi, BROTR, BROTL
PEU PERM, PERM32_64, PERM64_32,PERM64_64
Helper REPEAT, MOVE, SWAP
The toolchain unrolls the loops, in which the round operations are de-
fined, generates a dataflow graph, and optimizes the operation sequence for
underlying hardware. It issues the operations to available FUs as soon as their
operands are ready. Besides its own optimization process, the assembly lan-
guage and toolchain also allow users to hand-tune their implementation. Since
it finds implicit parallelism better, the automated toolchain enables achieving
throughput and resource utilization that are greater than or equal to well-
studied hand-based mapping.
Our experience leads us to believe that mapping an algorithm is straight-
forward as long as all of the necessary functional blocks are available. Multipli-
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cation, used in 11.5% of the analyzed algorithms, is a notable exception. Our
algorithm analysis suggests that 86.5% of studied algorithms can be mapped
efficiently onto current Cryptoraptor architecture. Since even multiplication
can be performed using existing FUs and we provided more functionality than
studied algorithms require, we strongly believe that Cryptoraptor can support
all existing algorithms.
7.1 Block Ciphers
Due to the large number of block ciphers in the literature and our al-
gorithm analysis, we mapped ten block ciphers to stress the flexibility of our
processor. The following sections provide brief descriptions about those algo-
rithms and how we mapped them onto our processor. The block ciphers that
we mapped are AES, Blowfish, Camellia, CAST-128, DES, GOST, Kasumi,
RC5, SEED, and Twofish.
Most of the block ciphers may be characterized as the Feistel network
invented by Horst Feistel in 1973 [71]. Feistel network is a transforming func-
tion structure which divides the data block into two halves and applies trans-
formation function f on one half using sub-key derived from user’s secret key.
Two halves of the data block are XORed and swapped at the end of each
round. The Feistel network structure may also be generalized to larger data
blocks. Figure 7.1 shows the high-level block diagrams of block ciphers that
use original or derived version of Feistel network.
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Figure 7.1: The overall structure of Feistel network and its derivations
7.1.1 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
AES is a NIST specification for the encryption and a widely used and
studied encryption algorithm. The AES algorithm is a symmetric block cipher
that processes 128-bit data blocks, called "state", using a secret key of length
128, 192, or 256 bits [58]. The cipher, which is structured as an SPN network,
executes 10, 12, or 14 rounds of transformation depending on the selected key
size. In this thesis, we focus our research and results on only encryption with
a 128-bit key and ten rounds of operation to be consistent with other papers in
the literature. In a traditional AES implementation, four operational stages
are performed during each round: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns and
AddRoundKey. The high-level structure of AES encryption is depicted in
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Figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: The traditional structure of AES
The SubBytes is a non-linear transformation, in which each byte from
the input state is replaced by another byte according to a predefined lookup
table. It can also be realized through calculation as the multiplicative inverse
in the finite Galois Field (GF) on 28 and a bitwise affine transformation.
The ShiftRows transformation function processes the state array by
circularly shifting the last three rows over different numbers of offsets.
The MixColumn transformation multiplies the columns of the data ma-
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trix by a predefined matrix over GF(28). The column multiplication of the
matrix is formulated as:
b0
b1
b2
b3
 =

02 03 01 01
01 02 03 01
01 01 02 03
03 01 01 02
×

a0
a1
a2
a3
 (7.1)
where a is the input column, ai denotes one byte of data in the corresponding
cell, and b is the output column. All multiplications and additions used in
MixColumn is defined in GF and dependent upon the field polynomial given
as:
f(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1; (7.2)
Even though the traditional flow of the algorithm includes an explicit
matrix multiplication operation in each round, there are some other realiza-
tions of this operation in the literature to get better performance or power and
area efficiency. While matrix multiplication can be implemented as a set of
logical operations (potentially in a pipelined structure), precalculated lookup
tables are also used since one operand of the multiplication is a constant ma-
trix.
The AddRoundKey transformation makes the relation between cipher-
text and user’s secret key by performing XOR operation with a set of sub keys
derived from the actual key.
Besides its traditional implementation, Rijndael [58] also suggested that
multiple stages of the round transformation can be combined as a single set of
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table lookups, allowing very fast implementations on processors. Using these
combined tables, the round transformation can be expressed as:
ej = T0[a0,j]⊕ T1[a1,j+1]⊕ T2[a2,j+2]⊕ T3[a3,j+3]⊕ kj; (7.3)
where a is the round input, ai,j denotes one byte of a in row i, column j, aj
denotes the column j of state a and T0, T1, T2, and T3 are the new combined
lookup tables. Hence T-box implementation of AES takes only 4 table lookups
and 4 XORs per column per round.
Due to the PE structure of our processor, the mapping T-box imple-
mentation onto our processor is straightforward: 16 parallel lookups in even
rounds and four parallel three level XOR reductions in odd rounds. In each
round, a 128-bit data block is divided into four 32-bit words, each of which are
fed into TLU in four parallel PEs. In each TLU, each byte of a 32-bit input is
used as an address for S-boxes to generate four 32-bit outputs. After 16 paral-
lel table lookup operations, sixteen 32-bit outputs are routed to LOUs in the
next level based on Equation 7.3. Finally, four 32-bit table lookup operation
and a round key is processed through XOR tree in each LOU to generate one
32-bit word of 128-bit output. This process is repeated ten times to encrypt
128-bit plaintext; thus, AES-128 encryption process requires 20 cycles on our
processor.
7.1.2 Blowfish
Blowfish is a secret-key block cipher proposed by Bruce Schneier in
1993 [188]. Blowfish operates on a block size of 64 bits while the key can be
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any length from 32 bits up to 448 bits. The algorithm was proposed to be an
alternative to DES and planned to be free from problems and constraints as-
sociated with other algorithms. However, it did not meet all the requirements
for a new cryptographic standard at the time.
Due to the nature of the algorithm, Blowfish is only suitable for appli-
cations where the key does not change often, as a communications link or an
automatic file encryptor. Even though it is not very common cryptographic
algorithm, Blowfish is included in IPsec and implemented in OpenSSL.
Figure 7.3: The round function of Blowfish
The algorithm iterates over a simple encryption function 16 times in
Feistel network structure. The F function of Feistel network uses four different
256-entry S-boxes, XOR and addition in modulo 232. Each byte of 32-bit input
is fed into four separate lookup tables as one address to produce four 32-bit
outputs. The outputs of S-boxes are combined using XOR operations and
an addition to generate 32-bit output as shown in Figure 7.3. The output of
the round function is XORed with the second half of the previous round and
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swapped its place.
Blowfish utilizes both XOR-SBOX and Arithmetic-XOR bundled op-
erations. Due to its structure and capability of our functional units, Blowfish
fits perfectly onto our processor and shows the capability of Cryptoraptor to
support similar block ciphers. One round of Blowfish takes three cycles in our
processor, yielding total of 48 cycles to transform 64-bit plaintext.
7.1.3 Camellia
Camellia, developed by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, is
a secret key block cipher working on 128-bit blocks of data using 128, 192,
and 256-bit secret key [10]. The proposed algorithm offers the same interface
specifications used in Advanced Encryption Standard. Camellia is one of the
algorithms listed in TLS and IPsec, and implemented in many cryptography
libraries.
The high-level structure of Camellia follows the Feistel network with
either 18 or 24 rounds depending on the selected key size. The overall structure
of the algorithms is shown in Figure 7.4. The round function F consists of
four different 256-entry tables with 8-bit values on each entry and apply affine
transformations and logical operations. As shown in Figure 7.5, the number
of lookup tables can be doubled to process 64-bit data at a time.
Besides its fairly complex round structure, a logical transformation
layer called "FL-function", and its inverse are applied in every six rounds. This
logical transformation layer consists of a AND, OR, XOR and left rotation by
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Figure 7.4: The high level structure of Camellia
1. The structure of FL-function is similar to the FL-function of Kasumi [141]
that we discuss in following the section. The only difference between Kasumi
and Camellia is the addition of 1-bit rotation. FL-function and FL−1-function
transform a 64-bit input X(64) to a 64-bit output Y(64) using 64-bit sub-key
k(64) as follows;
FL− function :
YR(32) = ((XL(32) ∩ kL(32)) <<< 1)⊕XR(32)
YL(32) = (YR(32) ∪ kR(32))⊕XL(32)
(7.4)
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Figure 7.5: The internal structure of one Camellia round
FL−1 − function :
XL(32) = (YR(32) ∪ kR(32))⊕ YL(32)
XR(32) = ((XL(32) ∩ kL(32)) <<< 1)⊕ YR(32)
(7.5)
Camellia is an excellent example algorithm that utilize both original
and rotated versions of the output on following stages. Besides the utilization
of byte shifters, it also requires changing control signal due to FL-function
and FL−1-function in every six rounds. Thus, it’s a good example algorithm
to stress the reconfigurability of our processor.
Even though the structure of Camellia algorithm seems to be fairly
complex in Figure 7.4, it can be realized as 32-bit XOR operations followed
by rotation instead of byte-wise XORs and complex connections among bytes
of 64-bit data. If we consider operation granularity as 32-bit, then P function
structure in a Camellia round becomes XOR operations between 32-bit halves
of 64-bit data while applying 1-, 2-, and 3-byte rotations in each level of XOR
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operation respectively.
Since FL and FL−1 functions consist of logical operations and a rota-
tion, mapping them into our processor is straightforward. The longest path
in each function requires three levels to perform a logical operation first, and
then rotation, and finally the second logical operation. While mapping, our
toolchain utilizes our independently configurable FU structure, which enables
us to start to process next round as soon as one column finishes its required op-
erations in the current round. Therefore, it enables us to start calculating FL
and FL−1-functions one cycle ahead. Since FL and FL−1 can be implemented
in one cycle thanks to our SRU structure, they are processed in parallel. One
round of Camellia takes five cycles in our processor, yielding total of 80 cycles
to transform 128-bit plaintext.
7.1.4 CAST-128
CAST-128 is a symmetric-key block cipher that operates on 64-bit data
blocks using a secret key with size of 40 to 128 bits in 8-bit increments [3].
It is a member of the CAST family of ciphers, proposed by Carlisle Adams
and Stafford Tavares in 1996. CAST-128 is listed in IPsec and OpenSSL, and
included in some versions of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and GNU Privacy
Guard (GPG).
CAST-128 follows Feistel Network structure with 12 or 16-rounds de-
pending on selected key length. Figure 7.6 summarizes the overall structure of
CAST-128 round function. It consists of four 256-entry lookup tables where
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Figure 7.6: The round function template for CAST-128
each entry holds 32-bit value. The round function of CAST-128 works on 32-
bit data half as input and starts with applying operation "a" using round key.
After splitting the result into four 8-bit pieces, each piece is fed into a different
lookup table. The output of lookup operations is combined using "b", "c", and
"d" operations.
A simple way to complete the definition of the CAST-128 round func-
tion is to select all operations ("a", b", "c", and "d") as XOR operations of 32-bit
quantities, although other operations or more complex structures may also be
used instead. The operations used in three different rounds of traditional
CAST-128 block cipher are as follows;
Type 1 :
I = ((Kmi + D) <<< Kri)
f = ((S1[Ia]⊕ S2[Ib])− S3[Ic]) + S4[Id]
(7.6)
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Type 2 :
I = ((Kmi⊕D) <<< Kri)
f = ((S1[Ia]− S2[Ib]) + S3[Ic])⊕ S4[Id]
(7.7)
Type 3 :
I = ((Kmi−D) <<< Kri)
f = ((S1[Ia] + S2[Ib])⊕ S3[Ic])− S4[Id]
(7.8)
where "D" is the data input to the round function, Ia, Ib, Ic, and Id denotes
bytes of I, + and− represent addition and subtraction modulo 232, ⊕ is bitwise
XOR, and <<< represents the rotation operation. Km and Kr denotes the
derived sub-key and amount of rotation for each round. The f functions
defined above are used in a predefined order. The function f in Type 1 is used
in rounds 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, and 16 while rounds 2, 5, 8, 11, and 14 use Type 2
and rounds 3, 6, 9, 12, and 15 use Type 3.
Each of these three round functions can be implemented using only
one PE column in our processor. Due to the varying round structure, control
signals for both PEs and Connection Rows do not remain constant. However,
control structure of our processor gives us the flexibility of changing connec-
tions and functional units used in PEs since each control memory is capable of
storing four different sets of control signals. Even without such flexibility, we
could map each different round structure to separate PE columns and route
the inputs accordingly.
While manually mapping the algorithm, we found that Type 1, 2, and 3
functional structures require 5, 3, and 4 cycles, respectively, and initialization
function I requires 2, 1, and 2 cycles in each type, respectively. However, our
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toolchain extracts more parallelism between rounds after unrolling the loops
and saves 7 more cycles per 64-bit data block. Thus, CAST-128 requires a
total of 73 cycles to transform 64-bit data block. Since only one PE column
is utilized for a given data block, Cryptoraptor enables us to process four
different data streams in parallel.
7.1.5 Data Encryption Standard (DES)
DES [1] is a secret-key block cipher designed by IBM in 1977 by de-
riving from Lucifer and submitted to National Bureau of Standards (NBS) as
a candidate for the protection of sensitive, unclassified electronic government
data. It has been widely used until theoretical weaknesses in the cipher were
demonstrated, and it was withdrawn as a standard by the NIST. DES and its
successors has been included in SSL, TLS, IPsec and implemented in almost
all security libraries.
The algorithm is designed to encipher and decipher 64-bit data blocks
under control of a 64-bit key. It takes 64-bit plaintext and transforms it
through a series of complicated operations through 16 rounds in Feistel network
structure to produce the same length ciphertext. The round function of DES,
shown in Figure 7.7, operates on one 32-bit half of data block and consists of
4 operation stages: (i) Expansion, (ii)Key mixing, (iii) Substitution, and (iv)
Permutation.
The first stage, Expansion, expands 32-bit half data block to 48 bits
using a predefined expansion permutation, denoted E in the diagram (Figure
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Figure 7.7: The round function f of DES
7.7). The result of Expansion stage is combined with a derived sub-key using
an XOR operation, called Key mixing stage.
After making the relation with input data and user key, the output is
split into eight 6-bit pieces, and each piece is fed into separate lookup table.
DES consists of eight different S-boxes, each of which takes 6-bit block as input
and yields a 4-bit block as output. Finally, outputs of S-boxes are rearranged
using a predefined table that controls the permutation. Thus, implementation
of DES highly relies on table lookup operations and bit manipulations.
Due to heavy use of bit manipulations, our mapping structure mostly
relies on PEU unit. Besides bit manipulations, DES consists of unorthodox
granularity for both S-box address and table lookup operations, 4-bit and 6-bit
respectively. Our PEU structure helps us to handle such different granularities
116
as well.
To better utilize available resource in our processor, we slightly modify
the traditional implementation. The first level of our mapping performs the
Expansion phase of the algorithm; however, produces two 32-bit outputs in-
stead of one 48-bit result. Doing so enables us to perform eight parallel table
lookup in one cycle. Therefore, the input bits are padded in a way that each
4-bit of the data starts at byte boundaries. Since we used PEU, it’s just a mat-
ter of defining the control signals in the setup phase. We also transform the
round key into two 32-bit halves in the first level. The second level performs
XOR operation between the output of the first level and a round key and feed
each byte to S-boxes as an address. The outputs of table lookups are combined
to produce two 32-bit outputs (one per TLU). In traditional implementation,
output of S-boxes should be 8x6-bits, but we padded table entries in a way
that each 6-bit of output starts at byte boundaries. Finally, two 32-bit output
from the second level is transformed in PEU to generate one 32-bit output
(Permutation phase). The last level of our mapping implements Permutation
phase of the algorithm as well as remove any additional padding bits that we
introduced in earlier levels. Therefore, one round of DES takes three cycles in
our processor, yielding total of 48 cycles to transform 64-bit plaintext.
The mapping and implementation of DES on our processor require
architecture and manual effort to achieve higher performance. The changes to
traditional implementation are manually introduced to help the toolchain to
map it more efficiently. However, the conventional implementation can also
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be mapped in exchange of performance.
7.1.6 GOST
The GOST block cipher is a symmetric-key cipher designed and used
by Soviet and Russian government for top secret information since 1970s, but
declassified and released to the public in 1994 [169]. It was an alternative to
the United States standard, DES, of the time.
Figure 7.8: The overall structure of GOST block cipher
GOST transforms 64-bit data block using 256-bit user key through
32 rounds in Feistel network. The round function of GOST cipher is pretty
straightforward, as shown in Figure 7.8. It takes one 64-bit data block as
input, splits it into two halves, and add a 32-bit derived sub-key in modulo
232. After modular addition, the 32-bit output is split into eight 4 bit pieces,
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each of which is fed into 4x4 S-box for substitution. Finally, the produced
32-bit value is left rotated by 11, and XORed with the other half of the input
data block.
Due to its structure, GOST can utilize only one bundle in our processor.
However, it enables us to show that our processor is capable of supporting
algorithms even if they do not fit into mainstream operation flows. Each
operation in one round of GOST can be implemented using one PE level.
Thus, one GOST round takes three cycles for round function and hides the
extra cycle required to establish Feistel Network, yielding total of 96 cycles to
transform 64-bit data block.
7.1.7 Kasumi
The Kasumi, also known as MISTY [141], is widely used for security
in many synchronous wireless standards; UMTS, GSM, and GPRS mobile
communications systems. It is also used as A5/3 key stream generator.
Kasumi is a block cipher with eight Feistel rounds with a key of up to
128 bits and works on 64-bit plaintext blocks. Each round uses a set of derived
round keys KLi, KOi, and KIi for each round i. It processes the 64- bit word
in two 32-bit halves, and the right half is XOR’ed with the output of the round
function after which the halves are swapped in each round. The input word
is concatenation of the left and right halves of the first round. Details on
traditional implementation of Kasumi algorithm are shown in Figure 7.9.
The structure of Kasumi consists of two slightly different round trans-
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Figure 7.9: The traditional structure of Kasumi
formations: even and odd rounds. In odd rounds, the round-function is com-
puted by applying the FL function followed by the FO function while it is in
reverse order for even rounds.
We specifically included Kasumi into our algorithm mapping discus-
sion to stress flexibility and reconfigurability of our processor with its data
dependent and fairly complex structure due to its unbalanced rounds and un-
orthodox table sizes (7- and 9-bit addressing).
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Figure 7.10: Merging one odd and one even round of Kasumi as one big
operation block.
Even though the structure of Kasumi seems to be highly data depen-
dent, it is possible to extract parallelism if we consider the size of operation as
16 bits instead. As Balderas described [18], we merged two asymmetric (odd
and even) rounds as one big operation block to fully utilize the parallelism
between operations. After merging one pair of odd and even rounds of Ka-
sumi, we can extract the parallelism between the functions (FL, FI, FO) of
Kasumi and XOR operations in between. Figure 7.10 shows how those func-
tional blocks can be rearranged to remove false data dependencies caused by
32-bit operations, hence extract more parallelism.
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While mapping proposed Kasumi structure onto the proposed architec-
ture, we extract even more parallelism due to four parallel processing elements
each of which has five independent highly powerful functional blocks that can
work in parallel. Even though we mostly followed the order of functions as
described in the proposed structure above, we introduced some further op-
timizations in appropriate places like redundantly calculate some operation
sequence to avoid data dependencies. Doing so enable us to save couple more
cycles in overall execution. Our current toolchain is not capable of doing such
optimizations automatically; thus we manually introduced them.
With the proposed structure, we managed to map Kasumi onto our
processor in an efficient way such that one big operation block (two rounds of
traditional Kasumi) requires 16 cycles to operate, yielding 66 cycles to encrypt
one block of plaintext.
7.1.8 Rivest Cipher 5 (RC5)
The RC5 is a secret-key block cipher proposed by Ron Rivest in 1994
[178]. It was a predecessor of the Advanced Encryption Standard candidate;
RC6. Unlike other symmetric-key ciphers, RC5 algorithm works on variable
block size (32, 64, or 128 bits) and secret key (up to 2040 bits). RC5 is imple-
mented in the OpenSSL crypto library, used in Secure/Multipurpose Internet
Mail Extensions (S/MIME) standard, and implemented in various products of
RSA Security LLC.
The encryption and decryption algorithms are exceptionally simple.
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Figure 7.11: Two half rounds (one round) of RC5
Figure 7.11 shows the high-level structure of RC5 round function. It consists
of a sequence of XOR operations, data-dependent left rotation, and an addition
in modulo 232. Compared to other block ciphers, RC5 heavily relies on data-
dependent rotations. The rotation operations are the only non-linear operator
in RC5; there are no non-linear substitution tables or other non-linear opera-
tors. The goal behind heavy use of rotations in the algorithm was to prompt
the study and evaluation of such operations as a cryptographic primitive.
Algorithm 7.1.1: RC5encrypt(plaintext, derivedSubkeys)
(A||B) = plaintext;
A = A + derivedSubkeys[0];
B = B + derivedSubkeys[1];
for i← 1 to 12
do
{
A = ((A⊕B) <<< B) + derivedSubkeys[2 + i];
B = ((B ⊕ A) <<< A) + derivedSubkeys[2 + i + 1];
return (ciphertext)
123
Even though the algorithm is flexible on block size, key size, and the
number of rounds, the suggested configuration uses 64-bit data blocks, 128-
bit secret key, and transforms the plaintext in 12 rounds. The algorithm can
be implemented using a few lines of code in software as shown in Algorithm
7.1.1. One 64-bit data block is split into two 32-bit halves; A and B, and
the resulting ciphertext is returned after applying the transformation of XOR,
rotation and modular addition for 12 rounds.
It’s straightforward to map RC5 onto our processor, where one RC5
round requires 4 levels (4 cycles) to implement the round function and a total
of 48 cycles to encrypt 64-bit data block. The mapping RC5 clearly shows the
power of having logical operation units bundled with shift/rotate operations.
Without having such structure one RC5 round requires six levels (6 cycles)
and a total of 72 cycles. Thus, it enables us to save 24 cycles.
Similar to some previous algorithms, Cryptoraptor enables us to apply
RC5 encryption to four different data block in parallel since only one PE
column is utilized for a given data stream. Therefore, full utilization of the
available hardware can increase the effective throughput.
7.1.9 SEED
SEED [128] is a symmetric-key cipher developed by the Korea Infor-
mation Security Agency and a group of experts in 1998 and has been used
since then. SEED is a national industrial association standard and is included
in several versions of SSL, TSL, IPsec, S/MIME, and Cryptographic Message
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Syntax (CMS).
Figure 7.12: The round structure of SEED block cipher
The high-level structure of SEED block cipher follows the Feistel net-
work through 16 rounds with 128-bit block size and a 128-bit secret key. The
round structure of the algorithm is shown in Figure 7.12. The overall structure
of SEED block cipher also has some resemblance to Kasumi in the recursive-
ness of its structure. While the overall structure is a Feistel network with
an F-function operating on 64-bit halves, the F-function is also a Feistel net-
work composed of a G-function operating on 32-bit halves as shown in Figure
7.12. The G-function takes a 32-bit half block as input, splits it into four 8-bit
pieces, passes each of them through S-boxes, and finally combines byte outputs
using a set of boolean functions such that each output bit depends on 3 of 4
input bytes. The algorithm consists of two 256 entry lookup tables with 8-bit
entries that are derived from discrete exponentiation. However, the amount of
the lookup table should be doubled to allow parallel accesses, yielding faster
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implementation.
Even though G function shown in Figure 7.12 looks complex and re-
quires complicated communication, it is actually not. When we carefully an-
alyzed the inputs of XOR operations within G function, we realized that the
byte-wise communication can be realized using byte shift operations after table
lookup operations. To be more specific; if we rotate the outputs W3, W2, and
W1 left by 1, 2, and three respectively, four parallel byte-wise XOR trees can
be merged to one 32-bit tree. These findings enabled us to map one round of
SEED takes ten cycles (1 initial + 3x3 G functions) in our processor, yielding
total of 160 cycles to transform 128-bit plaintext. Our toolchain extracts even
more parallelism after unrolling the loops and saves 8 cycles in total execution
time of 128-bit data.
7.1.10 Twofish
Twofish [189] is a secret-key block cipher designed by Bruce Schneier,
John Kelsey, Doug Whiting, David Wagner, Chris Hall, and Niels Ferguson
in 1998 by deriving from Blowfish, SAFER, and Square, and submitted to
Advanced Encryption Standard contest. It was selected as one of the five
finalists for a new standard. Twofish is one of a few ciphers included in the
OpenPGP standard and included in GNU Crypto library.
Twofish transforms 128-bit data block using a secret key up to 256
bits through 16 rounds in Feistel network with a bijective F function. The
overall structure of the algorithms is shown in Figure 7.13. The F function
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Figure 7.13: The overall structure of Twofish block cipher
consists of four key-dependent 8x8 S-boxes, a fixed 4-by-4 maximum distance
separable (MDS) matrix over GF(28), a pseudo-Hadamard transform, bitwise
rotations, and XOR operations. For faster implementation, the number of
S-boxes is doubled and matrix multiplication, shown as MDS, is implemented
as separate lookup table. A pseudo-Hadamard transforms (PHT) is a simple
mixing operation that is defined as;
a1 = a + b mod232
b1 = a + 2b mod232 (7.9)
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where a and b are two 32-bit inputs. That is; PHT is two parallel modular ad-
dition, one of which is operates on left shifted operand. The Figure 7.13 shows
how PHT is used within the algorithm. Due to its fairly regular and simple
datapath, implementation of Twofish is straightforward on both software and
hardware.
Even though Twofish can be mapped onto our processor as is, we in-
troduced some optimizations that enable us to fit it onto Cryptoraptor more
efficiently. The first thing we changed is the order of the rotation operation
before table lookup operations. Since it is a byte-wise rotation and the follow-
ing operation is byte-wise lookup, it is safe to change the order of S-boxes in
the loading phase, and have the rotation afterwards. Doing so enables us to
pack XOR, table lookup and rotation operation into TLU and save two redun-
dant cycles per round. Since MDS is a matrix multiplication over GF(28), we
pre-calculated a table to perform this operation in one cycle as it is done for
other algorithms that have matrix multiplication. Implementing matrix mul-
tiplication using a table lookup helps us to save a couple of cycles per round.
By using the advantage of having independently configurable functional units,
we performed XOR and rotate-by-1 operations on the second 64-bit half (two
32-bit operations shown in the right part of Figure 7.13) in parallel, which
allow us to save one extra cycle per round. Therefore, one round of Twofish
takes only five cycles in Cryptoraptor, yielding total of 80 cycles to transform
128-bit plaintext. Since Twofish can be implement using only two PE columns
for one data block, Cryptoraptor can be fully utilized with two parallel data
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stream for higher throughput.
7.2 Stream Ciphers
The following sections briefly describe how we mapped most widely
used stream cipher, RC4, and Phelix as an additional example. We already
described how we mapped the most common block cipher, Kasumi (A5/3)
used in UMTS, GSM, and GPRS mobile communications systems to provide
confidentiality and integrity. Since A5/2 is prohibited in 2006 due to its secu-
rity weakness, and straightforward structure of A5/1 (fixed sequence of shift
and bit-wise XOR operation), we choose to implement more complex stream
cipher; Phelix. Phelix is not used in any security standard but is a good
candidate to stress the flexibility of our processor.
7.2.1 Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4)
The RC4 [178] is a secret-key stream cipher designed by Ron Rivest in
1987 and published in 1994. RC4 is the most popular stream cipher in several
security protocols and standards; TLS, WEP, and WPA for wireless cards,
and included in cryptographic libraries; OpenSSL and GNU Crypto.
RC4 is a binary additive stream cipher with a variable sized key that
can range between 8 and 2048 bits in multiples of 8 bits. Like other ciphers,
RC4 consists of two part: (i) key-scheduling and (ii) encryption. During
key scheduling process, a lookup table of 256-entry is initialized and is used
throughout the encryption process. However, unlike other ciphers mentioned
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before, encryption phase of RC4 also make changes on the lookup table by
swapping the entries. The details of encryption phase are defined as follows.
Algorithm 7.2.1: RC4encrypt(plaintext, keyArray, ciphertext)
j = 0; for i← 0 to messageLength
do

i = (i + 1)mod256
j = (j + keyArray[i])mod256
swap(keyArray[i], keyArray[j]);
keyIndex = (keyArray[i] + keyArray[j])mod256;
ciphertext[i] = plaintext[i]⊕ keyArray[keyIndex];
One round of RC4 produces a word of the keystream and XOR it with
the plaintext to produce the ciphertext. Therefore, each round generates one
byte of keystream and ciphertext.
Compared to other algorithms, mapping RC4 onto our processor is a
bit more difficult due to frequent table lookups and table updates. For that
reason, RC4 algorithm significantly stresses the flexibility of Cryptoraptor and
our mapping process. Due to the fact that lookup tables are being updated and
indexed, it is not possible to unroll the loop over multiple PE levels, and we are
restricted to use same PE rows. We naively mapped RC4 round function and
tried to utilize operation bundles available in FUs as much as possible. One
RC4 round requires eight levels (8 cycles) to implement the round function,
and a total of (4x8xmessageLength) cycles to encrypt a given message. Even
though RC4 does not fit into our processor perfectly, we are still able to support
such a complex algorithm. Thus, like Kasumi, RC4 also provides good insight
about the flexibility of Cryptoraptor. Since RC4 is implemented using a single
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PE column, four parallel data streams can be encrypted concurrently for higher
throughput.
7.2.2 Phelix
Phelix is a high-speed stream cipher with a built-in MAC functionality,
developed by DougWhiting, Bruce Schneier, Stefan Lucks, and Frederic Muller
for eSTREAM contest in 2004 [217]. The algorithm is a slightly modified form
of an earlier cipher, Helix, developed by the same designers in 2003.
Even though it is not included in any security protocols or standards, we
included it in our algorithm mapping process to stress our processor’s flexibility
with another complex algorithm that includes several parallel operations and
connections.
Phelix algorithm consists of a sequence of blocks and an encryption
function over each block. Figure 7.14 shows the high-level structure of Phelix
one block (two-half block) encryption. The algorithm relies on only addition in
modulo 232, XOR operation, and rotation by a pre-defined number of bits. A
single round of Phelix consists of adding (or XORing) one active state word into
the next, and rotating the first word. One full Phelix block consists of twenty
simple rounds. Each block is 160-bit, divided into five 32-bit variables denoted
as Z(i)0 , Z
(i)
1 , Z
(i)
2 , Z
(i)
3 , and Z
(i)
4 . While four of these five state variables are
used as input to the next block, the remaining one 32-bit variable is generated
as output at the end of the current block.
Mapping Phelix onto our processor proves the degree of complexity for
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Figure 7.14: One block of Phelix encryption
connections between PEs and justifies the full crossbar connection structure
between the levels. One half block of Phelix requires 2 PE columns and five
levels to be implemented in our processor, yielding a total of 10 cycles to
process 32-bit of the message.
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7.3 Cryptographic Hash Functions
In following sections, we explain how we mapped widely used crypto-
graphic hash functions; MD4, MD5, SHA-1, and SHA-2 onto our processor.
Many popular hash algorithms may be characterized as Merkle-Damgard con-
struction invented by Ralph Merkle in 1979 [147]. Merkle-Damgard construc-
tion is a method of building collision-resistant cryptographic hash functions
using collision-resistant one-way compression functions. The Figure 7.15 shows
the high-level structure of Merkle-Damgard construction.
Figure 7.15: The high level structure of the Merkle-Damgard construction
The hash functions that follow the Merkle-Damgard construction take
a message of arbitrary length as input, add padding to extend the message to
appropriate length, iteratively transform message blocks using one-way com-
pression function and an initialization vector, and finally produce fixed-length
message digest. Therefore, a good hash function consists of: (i) a collision-
resistant compression function, (ii) a padding procedure, and (iii) a good initial
vector.
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7.3.1 Message Digest Algorithm-4 (MD4)
MD4 is a cryptographic hash function designed by Ronald Rivest in
1990 [176]. MD4 is one of the widely known hash functions and triggered
researchers to develop new attacks for cryptographic hash functions. However,
it is possible to find an another message that produces the same MD4 digest
as a given message without requiring a brute force search. The structure of
MD4 inspired and influenced other later designs such as MD5, SHA-1, and
RIPEMD, and it was replaced with its successor, MD5, due to its security
issues. MD4 has been used in Microsoft security protocol suite, NT LAN
Manager (NTLM), provides authentication, integrity, and confidentiality to
users. It is also incorporated into PGP v1.0 and S/MIME and implemented
in OpenSSL, Crypto++, and many other cryptography libraries.
Figure 7.16: The round structure of MD4
The algorithm takes a message of arbitrary length as input, transforms
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each 128-bit block of message through 3 rounds (each of which consists of
16 inner rounds), and produces a 128-bit message digest of the input as an
output. The detailed structure of round operation is shown in Figure 7.16.
The algorithm relies on 128-bit state, divided into four 32-bit words (A, B,
C, and D) and applies a sequence of addition in modulo 232, rotation, and
a logical function F . Each one of three rounds uses different F functions as
defined below.
F (B,C,D) = (B ∧ C) ∨ ((¬B) ∧D)
G(B,C,D) = (B ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧D) ∨ (C ∧D)
H(B,C,D) = B ⊕ C ⊕D
(7.10)
Thanks to our powerful LOU, which consists of six independently con-
figurable logic blocks, we can implement any F function defined above in one
cycle. Since we can store up to four sets of control signals per PE, changing
round functions can be controlled by the state machine easily. Instead of fol-
lowing the traditional operation order, we added Mi and Ki as the first step in
parallel while processing F function. Doing so enables us to save one cycle per
round. Even though the first inner round still takes four cycles, the remaining
inner rounds (15+2*16) will take only three cycles each. Thus, processing
128-bit block of the message will be processed in total of 145 cycles. Consider-
ing hashing process will continue for other 128-bit blocks of the message; the
rounds will take only three cycles after spending four cycles at the very first
128-bit block of the message.
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7.3.2 Message Digest Algorithm-5 (MD5)
MD5 [175] is a cryptographic hash function designed by Ronald Rivest
in 1992 to replace prior hash function, MD4. Due to the high number of rounds
and extra modular addition, MD5 is slower than MD4 but is more secure in
design. MD5 has been utilized in a wide variety of cryptographic applications
for a significant amount of time and has been commonly used to verify data
integrity. It has been included in many standards such as SSL, TLS, IPsec,
S/MIME, and NTLM, and implemented in almost all cryptography libraries.
Figure 7.17: The structure of one MD5 operation
MD5 takes a message of arbitrary length as input, splits the message
into 512-bit message blocks, and transforms message blocks to 128-bit message
digest through 4 rounds of 16 MD5 operations. As shown in Figure 7.17, the
overall structure of MD5 is very similar to MD4 with an additional modular
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addition after rotation. The F functions used in each round are also slightly
different to provide higher security. With a given 128-bit state, divided into
four 32-bit words (A, B, C, and D), the round functions are defined as follows;
F (B,C,D) = (B ∧ C) ∨ ((¬B) ∧D)
G(B,C,D) = (B ∧D) ∨ (C ∧ (¬D))
H(B,C,D) = B ⊕ C ⊕D
I(B,C,D) = C ⊕ (B ∧ (¬D))
(7.11)
Mapping process of MD5 algorithm onto our processor is very similar
to the one for MD4. However, MD5 requires one more modular addition after
the last rotation operation. Even though the round functions used in MD5
are quite different than the ones in MD4, they also can be implemented in one
LOU. Having four different round function does not cause any issue since our
control memories for PEs are capable of storing four sets of control signals and
controlled by the state machine very easily.
Similar to MD4 mapping, we process addition operations for A, Mi,
and Ki in advance wherever we can, which allows us to save one extra cycles
per round except the very first round. Therefore, processing 512-bit message
requires a total of 257 cycles (5+63x4) in our processor. Our toolchain extracts
more parallelism with loop-unrolling optimization, which saves three cycles in
total execution time; yielding 254 cycles to process 512-bit message. Since 2
PE columns is required to implement MD5 (one for algorithm and the other
one for parallel additions), remaining 2 PE columns can be used for processing
one more message stream in parallel.
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7.3.3 Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA1)
SHA-1 is a cryptographic hash function designed by the U.S National
Security Agency in 1995 and published by the NIST as a U.S. Federal Infor-
mation Processing Standard [64]. Due to the similarity of the round structure,
it seems to be the successor of MD4 and MD5. However, the level of secu-
rity provided by SHA-1 is significantly higher than its predecessors. SHA-1 is
the world’s most popular cryptographic hash function which is included in all
important standards such as SSL, TLS, IPsec, S/MIME, SSH, and PGP, and
implemented in all cryptography libraries.
Figure 7.18: The round structure of SHA-1
SHA-1 is an iterative hash function that takes a message of length less
than 264 bits, processes 512-bit input message blocks, and produces a 160-bit
message digest of the input as an output. As shown in Figure 7.18, SHA-
1 follows a similar structure to MD4 and MD5 with slight differences. The
algorithm operates on 160-bit state, divided into five 32-bit words that are
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denoted as A, B, C, D, and E. The state update transformation of SHA-1
consists of 4 rounds of 20 steps in each. The transformation functions used in
each round are very similar to the ones in MD4 and defined as follows;
F (t;B,C,D) = (B ∧ C) ∨ ((¬B) ∧D) (0 <= t <= 19)
F (t;B,C,D) = B ⊕ C ⊕D (20 <= t <= 39)
F (t;B,C,D) = (B ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧D) ∨ (C ∧D) (40 <= t <= 59)
F (t;B,C,D) = B ⊕ C ⊕D (60 <= t <= 79)
(7.12)
After the last step of the state update transformation, the initial state
variables (A0, B0, C0, D0, and E0) and the final state (A80, B80, C80, D80, and
E80) are combined using addition in modulo 232. The result this step is either
the final hash value or the initial value to process the next 512-bit message
block.
As we did for MD4 and MD5, we added Mi and Ki in the first level.
However, adding the state variable E and shifted version of A can also be done
in parallel in SHA-1 algorithm. Doing so, we can map one round of SHA-1 onto
our processor in 3 cycles. Thus, it takes a total of 240 cycles (80 rounds x 3) to
process 512-bit input message block. Again with the help of our toolchain, we
were able to extract the parallelism hidden between loops and save 15 cycles
in total (yielding 225 cycles) to process one 512-bit input message block.
7.3.4 Secure Hash Algorithm-2 (SHA2)
Like its predecessor, SHA-2 [74] is a cryptographic hash function de-
signed by the U.S National Security Agency in 2001 and published by the NIST
as a U.S. Federal Information Processing Standard. The new algorithm was
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published as a set of functions (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512)
for varying message digest sizes; 224, 256, 384, and 512 bits. Even though
SHA-1 is still a widely used in cryptographic applications, NIST emphasizes
that applications that require collision resistance must use the SHA-2 family
of hash functions. All standards that include SHA-1 has been either replaced
the use of SHA-1 with SHA-2 or supported both at the same time.
Figure 7.19: The round structure of SHA-2
The SHA-2 hash function takes a message of arbitrary length as input,
splits the message into 512-bit message blocks, and transforms message blocks
to a message digest of 224, 256, 384, and 512 bits depending on chosen size.
SHA-2 algorithm family utilizes eight 32-bit state variables labelled as A, B,
..., H, which are initialised to pre-defined values H0-H7 at the start of the
hash function. The 32-bit values of the A to H variables are updated in each
140
round through 64 or 80 rounds, and the new values are used in the next round.
The high-level structure of SHA-2 round is shown in Figure 7.19. The round
structure and functions used in each round consist of a sequence of addition in
modulo 232, rotation, and logical primitives. The functions used in each round
is defined as follows;
Ch(E,F,G) = (E ∧ F )⊕ (: E ∧G)
Ma(E,F,G) = (E ∧ F )⊕ (E ∧G)⊕ (F ∧G)
Σ0(A) = (A >>> 2)⊕ (A >>> 13)⊕ (A >>> 22)
Σ1(E) = (E >>> 6)⊕ (E >>> 11)⊕ (E >>> 25)
(7.13)
At the end of each round, the ith intermediate hash value H i is com-
puted by adding state variables with corresponding 32-bit word of (i − 1)th
round’s output hash value H i−1, where H i is defined as {H i0||H i1||...||H i7}. The
output hash value of each 64 or 80 rounds either the final hash value or the
initial value to process the next 512-bit message block.
As we did for previous cryptographic hash functions, we choose to pro-
cess the required operations in parallel by taking the advantage of multiple
parallel FUs instead of following traditional operation flow. In the first PE
level, we calculate Ch, Ma, add Mi and Ki in one PE and state variables
H and D on the other, and process rotation operations for Σ0. The second
level calculates Ch + Mi + Ki, Ma + H + D, apply XOR operations to the
outputs of rotations, and process rotation operations for Σ1. In the third level,
Ch + Mi + Ki and Σ0 are added and XOR operations to the outputs of ro-
tations are applied. The fourth level generates the new value of E by adding
Ch + Mi + Ki + Σ0 and H + D while Ch + Mi + Ki + Σ0 + Ma + H + D is
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generated on the other PE. Finally, Σ1 is added to generate new value of state
variable A.
One round of SHA-2 requires five cycles to be mapped onto our proces-
sor. Thus, it takes a total of 320 cycles (64 rounds x 5) to process one 512-bit
input message block.
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Chapter 8
Future Work
In previous chapters, we provided a detailed description of the current
architecture of our reconfigurable cryptographic processor. However, there
are still potential improvements for functional units as well as overall proces-
sor design to achieve a higher degree of flexibility and even higher possible
throughput for all.
The lack of dedicated multiplication units is one of the main limitations
of Cryptoraptor, which restricts the algorithm coverage of our processor for
both existing and future cryptographic algorithms. Therefore, multiplication
unit can be a good candidate for next hardware improvement; yielding 8.1%
increase in the algorithm coverage for existing algorithms. However, adding
a dedicated multiplication unit into existing PE as separate functional unit
has a significant impact on processor’s cycle time as discussed in the previous
chapter. Thus, integrating a multiplication functionality into current processor
requires either a pipelined structure or special design for multiplication unit.
Even though the most of the modular arithmetic operations can be
implemented using existing functional units, the current design can be ex-
tended to support varying and unorthodox modulo bases. Extending existing
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hardware for modular arithmetic may increase the algorithm coverage of our
processor by 2 percent while having both multiplication unit and modular
arithmetic support may increase up to 13.5 percent.
Our current toolchain has limited capabilities and does not provide
aggressive optimizations. A more powerful automatic mapping structure for
cryptographic algorithms using a crypto-specific language or ideally high level
language like C/C++ can be developed for robust and high performance map-
ping of the algorithms. Such a toolchain might also solve the issues related to
multiplication and modular arithmetic automatically by mapping these oper-
ations to existing hardware on the fly.
Since the FU utilization of the mapped algorithm is low, we might also
develop a new synthesis toolchain which takes a set of algorithms targeted
to be supported and a set of constraints, design a new architecture using
proposed FUs and bundles, and outputs RTL code of new processor. Such
methodology will limit the flexibility of the generated processor, but it will
achieve higher performance, better area, power, and resource utilization for
the targeted algorithms.
Since we initially set the target of our processor as symmetric-key en-
cryption and cryptographic hash functions, public-key cryptography is beyond
the scope of this work. Public-key cryptography may require different func-
tional units and/or major changes on datapath due to its different structure
and requirements. We left extending our hardware support for public-key cryp-
tography as future work for the ideal and complete cryptographic processor.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
In this thesis, we presented the current architectural structure of our
reconfigurable cryptographic processor and the rationales that shaped our
processor design. Our first goal was to have a complete, flexible, and high
throughput cryptographic processor that can support a wide range of ciphers
and cryptographic hash functions.
We provided a comprehensive literature review on cryptographic algo-
rithms and detailed analysis on the specifications and requirements of various
crypto-systems. Such a detailed analysis might help both cryptographic al-
gorithm developers and hardware developers while designing new algorithms,
standards, and hardware implementations.
After describing our processor design and our rationales, we also pro-
vided detailed analysis of our processor in terms of performance, area, power,
and the algorithm coverage. We believe providing such detailed study, and
evaluation may enable both cryptographic algorithm developers and researchers
to explore performance, power, and area trade-offs while designing new algo-
rithms.
We are still exploring design trade-offs for functional units as well as
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overall processor design to achieve a higher degree of flexibility and highest
possible throughput for all. To achieve that, we plan to eliminate limitations
of the current design, further improve its performance, and excessively stress
it for flexibility and throughput with more cryptographic algorithms.
We developed a highly reconfigurable cryptographic processor, Cryp-
toraptor, that supports a wide range of symmetric key encryption algorithms
and cryptographic hash functions efficiently and has high potential to sup-
port future ones. Our results show that Cryptoraptor with its 1GHz clock
frequency can compete in term of performance with high-end ASIC cores
and FPGA solutions while achieving 25X and 160X higher throughput per
area than the best CPU and GPU solutions, respectively. To the best of our
knowledge, the proposed cryptographic processor supports the widest set of
cryptographic algorithms and the only crypto-specific processor that have the
capability of supporting the future algorithms. Through this thesis, we hope
to demonstrate the potential of our processor design for high performance
cryptographic applications.
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Appendix A
Detailed Operation Classes Usage
Table A.1: The special functional unit requirements in cryptographic algo-
rithms
Algorithm Arithmetic
Op.
Table
Lookup
Logical
Op.
Shifter &
Rotator
Permutation
&
Expansion
Block Ciphers
3WAY X X
AES X X
Akelarre X X X
Anubis X X X
ARIA X X
BaseKing X X
Blowfish X X X
Camellia X X X
CAST-128 X X X X
CAST-256 X X X X
CIKS-1 X X X
Cipherunicorn-A X X X X
Cipherunicorn-E X X X X
CLEFIA X X
CMEA X X
COCONUT98 X X X X
Crab X X X X X
Cryptomeria/C2 X X X X X
CRYPTON X X X
CS-Cipher X X X
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DEAL X X X
DES X X X
DESX X X X
DFC X X X X
E2 X X X
FEAL X X X X
FEALNX X X
FEA-M X X
FOX X X
FROG X X X
GOST X X X X
Grand Cru X X X
Hasty Pudding cipher X X X
Hierocrypt-3 X X X X
Hierocrypt-L1 X X X X
ICE X X X
IDEA X X
Intel Cascade Cipher X X X
KeeLoq X X
KHAZAD X X X
Khufu and Khafre X X
KLEIN X X
KN-Cipher X X
Ladder-DES X X X
LED X X X X
LOKI97 X X X X
LUCIFER X X X X
M6 X X X
M8 X X X X
MacGuffin X X X
Madryga X X
MAGENTA X X
MARS X X X X X
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MBAL X X X
Mercy X X X
MESH X X
Kasumi X X X X
MMB X X
MULTI2 X X X
MultiSwap X
New Data Seal X X X
NewDES X X
Nimbus X X
Noekeon X X X
NUSH X X X
NXT X X X
PRESENT X X
PRINCE X X X X
Q X X X X
RC2 X X X
RC5 X X X X
RC6 X X X
REDOC III X X X
SAFER K-128 X X X
SAFER K-64 X X X
SAFER+ X X X
SC2000 X X X X
SEED X X X X X
Serpent X X X
SHACAL X X X
SHACAL-2 X X X
Shark X X X
Skipjack X X
SMS4 X X X
Spectr-H64 X X X
Square X X
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SXAL X X X
TEA X X X
Threefish X X X X X
Twofish X X X X
UES X X
Xenon X X X
Xmx X
XTEA X X X
XXTEA X X X
Zodiac X X X
Hash Functions
BLAKE X X X X
GOST X X X
Groestl X X X X X
HAS-160 X X
Haval X X X
Hamsi X X
JH X X X
Keccak X X
MD2 X X X
MD4 X X X
MD5 X X X
MD6 X X X
PANAMA X X X
RadioGatÃžn X X X
RIPEMD X X X
RIPEMD-160 X X X
SHA-0 X X X
SHA-1 X X X
SHA-2 X X X
SHAvite3 X X X
SipHash X X X
Skein X X X X
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Snefru X X X
SWIFFT X X X X
TIGER X X X
Whirlpool X X X
Stream Ciphers
A5/1 X X X X
A5/2 X X X X
Achterbahn X X X
DECIM X X X
FFCSR X X X
FISH X X X X
GRAIN X X X X
HC256 X X X X X
ISAAC X X X X
MICKEY X X X
MUGI X X X X
PANAMA X X X X
Phelix X X X
Py X X X X
Rabbit X X X
RC4 X X
Salsa20 X X X
Scream X X X X
SEAL X X X X
Sfinks X X X
SNOW X X X X
Trivium X X X X
Turing X X X X
VEST X X X X
WAKE X X X X
Yamb X X X
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Appendix B
Operation Clusters
Table B.1: Operation clusters and patterns
Operation Classes Cryptographic algorithms
Logical, Shift/Rotate,
Table Lookup,
Arithmetic
BLAKE, CAST-128, CAST-256, Cipherunicorn-A,
Cipherunicorn-E, COCONUT98, Crab, Cryptomeria/C2,
FEAL, GOST, Groestl, HC256, MARS, Py, SC2000, Scream,
SEAL, SEED, SNOW, Threefish, Twofish, WAKE
Logical, Shift/Rotate,
Table Lookup
Anubis, Camellia, GRAIN, Grand Cru, Hasty Pudding cipher,
Hierocrypt-3, Hierocrypt-L1, Intel Cascade Cipher, Kasumi,
KHAZAD, LED, LUCIFER, MacGuffin, MUGI, Noekeon,
NXT, PRINCE, Q, REDOC III, Serpent, Shark, SHAvite3,
SMS4, Snefru, VEST, Whirlpool
Logical, Table
Lookup, Arithmetic
Blowfish, DFC, LOKI97, Mercy, SAFER K-128, SAFER K-64,
SAFER+, Yamb
Logical, Table Lookup
AES, ARIA, CRYPTON, CS-Cipher, DEAL, DES, DESX, E2,
FEALNX, FOX, FROG, ICE, JH, Khufu and Khafre, Ladder-
DES, MAGENTA, MBAL, MD2, New Data Seal, NewDES,
Skipjack, Square, SXAL, Zodiac
Logical, Shift/Rotate
3WAY, A5/1, A5/2, Achterbahn, Akelarre, BaseKing, CIKS-1,
FFCSR, FISH, Hamsi, HAS-160, Haval, HC256, ISAAC, Kec-
cak, M6, M8, Madryga, MD4, MD5, MD6, MICKEY, MULTI2,
NUSH, PANAMA, PANAMA, Phelix, Rabbit, RadioGatÃžn,
RC2, RC5, RC6, RIPEMD, RIPEMD-160, Salsa20, Sfinks,
SHA0, SHA1, SHA2, SHACAL, SHACAL-2, SipHash, Skein,
Spectr-H64, TEA, TIGER, Trivium, Xenon, XTEA, XXTEA
Logical, Arithmetic
A5/1, A5/2, Akelarre, CMEA, DECIM, FEA-M, FISH, GOST,
Haval, HC256, IDEA, ISAAC, M6, M8, MD4, MD5, MESH,
MULTI2, Nimbus, NUSH, PANAMA, Phelix, Rabbit, Radio-
GatÃžn, RC2, RC5, RC6, RIPEMD, RIPEMD-160, Salsa20,
SHA0, SHA1, SHA2, SHACAL, SHACAL-2, SipHash, Skein,
TEA, TIGER, Trivium, Xenon, XTEA, XXTEA
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Logical, Permuta-
tion/Expansion
A5/1, A5/2, Achterbahn, CIKS-1, CLEFIA, Crab, Cryptome-
ria/C2, CRYPTON, CS-Cipher, DEAL, DECIM, DES, DESX,
DFC, E2, FFCSR, FISH, FROG, GOST, GRAIN, Groestl,
HC256, Hierocrypt-3, Hierocrypt-L1, ICE, ISAAC, JH, Ka-
sumi, KeeLoq, KN-Cipher, Ladder-DES, LED, LOKI97, LU-
CIFER, M8, MARS, MBAL, MD2, MD6, MICKEY, MMB,
MUGI, New Data Seal, PANAMA, PANAMA, PRINCE, Q,
RC5, SEED, Sfinks, Skein, Spectr-H64, SXAL, Threefish, Triv-
ium, UES, VEST, Zodiac
Shift/Rotate SWIFFT, Turing
Table Lookup KLEIN, PRESENT, RC4, SWIFFT, Turing
Arithmetic MultiSwap, RC4, SWIFFT, Turing
Permutation/Expansion KLEIN, PRESENT, SWIFFT, Turing
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Appendix C
Operation Bundles
Table C.1: Operation patterns
Operation patterns Cryptographic algorithms
XOR - SBOX
AES, Anubis, ARIA, BLAKE, Camellia, Cipherunicorn-A,
Cipherunicorn-E, Cryptomeria/C2, CRYPTON, CS-Cipher,
DEAL, DES, DESX, E2, FEAL, FEALNX, FROG, GRAIN,
Grand Cru, Hierocrypt-3, Hierocrypt-L1, ICE, Intel Cas-
cade Cipher, Kasumi, KHAZAD, Khufu and Khafre, KLEIN,
Ladder-DES, LED, LOKI97, MacGuffin, MAGENTA, MARS,
MBAL, MD2, Mercy, MUGI, NewDES, Noekeon, NXT,
PRESENT, PRINCE, SAFER K-128, SAFER K-64, SAFER+,
SEED, Serpent, Shark, SHAvite3, Skipjack, SMS4, Snefru,
Square, SXAL, Turing, Twofish, Whirlpool, Zodiac
SBOX - XOR
AES, Anubis, ARIA, BLAKE, Camellia, CAST-128, CAST-
256, Cipherunicorn-A, Cipherunicorn-E, COCONUT98, Crab,
Cryptomeria/C2, CRYPTON, CS-Cipher, DFC, E2, FEAL,
FEALNX, FOX, FROG, GRAIN, Grand Cru, Hierocrypt-
3, Hierocrypt-L1, Intel Cascade Cipher, JH, Kasumi,
KHAZAD, Khufu and Khafre, KLEIN, LED, LOKI97, LU-
CIFER, MacGuffin, MAGENTA, MARS, MBAL, MD2, Mercy,
NewDES, Noekeon, NXT, SAFER K-128, SAFER K-64,
SAFER+, SEED, Serpent, Shark, SHAvite3, Skipjack, SMS4,
Snefru, Square, SXAL, Turing, Twofish, WAKE, Whirlpool,
Yamb, Zodiac
XOR - SBOX - XOR
AES, Anubis, ARIA, BLAKE, Camellia, Cipherunicorn-A,
Cipherunicorn-E, Cryptomeria/C2, CRYPTON, CS-Cipher,
E2, FEAL, FEALNX, FROG, GRAIN, Grand Cru, Hierocrypt-
3, Hierocrypt-L1, Intel Cascade Cipher, Kasumi, KHAZAD,
Khufu and Khafre, KLEIN, LED, LOKI97, MacGuffin, MA-
GENTA, MARS, MBAL, MD2, Mercy, NewDES, Noekeon,
NXT, SAFER K-128, SAFER K-64, SAFER+, SEED, Serpent,
Shark, SHAvite3, Skipjack, SMS4, Snefru, Square, SXAL, Tur-
ing, Twofish, Whirlpool, Zodiac
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XOR - Arithmetic
Akelarre, BLAKE, Blowfish, CAST-128, CAST-256, CMEA,
Crab, Cryptomeria/C2, GOST, HAS-160, Haval, IDEA, M6,
MARS, MD4, MD5, MESH, MULTI2, NUSH, Phelix, SEED,
SHA0, SHA1, SHA2, SHACAL, SHACAL-2, SNOW, TEA,
TIGER, Twofish, XTEA, XXTEA, Yamb
Arithmetic - XOR
Akelarre, BLAKE, Blowfish, CAST-128, CAST-256, Crab,
Cryptomeria/C2, HAS-160, IDEA, MARS, MD4, MD5, Mercy,
MESH, MULTI2, NUSH, Phelix, SHA0, SHA1, SHA2, SHA-
CAL, SHACAL-2, SNOW, TEA, Threefish, TIGER, Twofish,
XTEA, XXTEA
XOR - Arithmetic -
XOR
Akelarre, BLAKE, Blowfish, CAST-128, CAST-256, Crab,
Cryptomeria/C2, HAS-160, IDEA, MARS, MD4, MD5, MESH,
MULTI2, NUSH, Phelix, SHA0, SHA1, SHA2, SHACAL,
SHACAL-2, SNOW, TEA, TIGER, Twofish, XTEA, XXTEA
Logic - SHIFT
3WAY, Akelarre, Anubis, BaseKing, BLAKE, Camellia, CAST-
128, CAST-256, Cipherunicorn-A, Cipherunicorn-E, Cryp-
tomeria/C2, E2, FFCSR, GOST, Hamsi, Hasty Pudding ci-
pher, HC256, Kasumi, Keccak, KHAZAD, M8, MacGuffin,
MD6, MICKEY, MUGI, MULTI2, Noekeon, NUSH, NXT,
Phelix, PRINCE, Q, RC5, RC6, Serpent, SHA2, SHACAL-2,
SHAvite3, SipHash, Skein, SMS4, Twofish, Whirlpool, XXTEA
SHIFT - Logic
3WAY, A5/1, A5/2, Achterbahn, Akelarre, Anubis, BaseK-
ing, BLAKE, Camellia, Cipherunicorn-A, Cipherunicorn-E,
DECIM, E2, FFCSR, Hamsi, HC256, Kasumi, Keccak,
KHAZAD, M6, M8, MARS, MD6, MICKEY, MUGI, MULTI2,
Noekeon, NXT, Phelix, PRINCE, RC6, Salsa20, SC2000,
SEAL, Serpent, Sfinks, SHA2, SHACAL-2, SHAvite3, SipHash,
SMS4, SNOW, Spectr-H64, Threefish, Twofish, WAKE,
Whirlpool, XTEA, XXTEA
Logic - SHIFT - Logic
3WAY, Akelarre, Anubis, BaseKing, BLAKE, Camel-
lia, Cipherunicorn-A, Cipherunicorn-E, E2, FFCSR, Hamsi,
HC256, Kasumi, Keccak, KHAZAD, M8, MD6, MICKEY,
MUGI, MULTI2, Noekeon, NXT, Phelix, PRINCE, RC6, Ser-
pent, SHA2, SHACAL-2, SHAvite3, SipHash, SMS4, Twofish,
Whirlpool, XXTEA
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Appendix D
Detailed Processing Element Width Usage
The Table D.1 summarizes parallel processing element requirement of each algorithm.
Algorithms are clustered based on not only exact requirements but also possible performance
gain when more processing element is used.
Table D.1: Operation width (PE way)
PE Width Cryptographic algorithms
1 Blowfish, CAST-128, CAST-256, GOST, ICE, KeeLoq, Madryga,MultiSwap, Xmx
2
Achterbahn, Camellia, Cryptomeria/C2, CS-Cipher, DEAL, DES,
DESX, Hasty Pudding cipher, Hierocrypt-L1, KN-Cipher, Ladder-
DES, LUCIFER, M6, M8, MacGuffin, MBAL, MD4, MD5, MD6,
Mercy, MICKEY, MUGI, MULTI2, Nimbus, Noekeon, NUSH,
PRINCE, Py, RC4, RC5, REDOC III, Sfinks, SHA0, SHA1, SHA-
CAL, Skipjack, Spectr-H64, SXAL, Threefish, UES, Whirlpool
4
3WAY, A5/1, A5/2, AES, Akelarre, ARIA, BaseKing, BLAKE, CIKS-
1, Cipherunicorn-E, CLEFIA, CMEA, COCONUT98, Crab, CRYP-
TON, DFC, E2, FEAL, FEALNX, FEA-M, FISH, FOX, FROG,
GOST, GRAIN, Grand Cru, Hamsi, HAS-160, HC256, Hierocrypt-
3, IDEA, Intel Cascade Cipher, ISAAC, JH, Kasumi, KHAZAD,
Khufu and Khafre, KLEIN, LED, LOKI97, MARS, MD2, MESH,
MMB, New Data Seal, NewDES, NXT, PRESENT, Q, RadioGatÃžn,
RIPEMD, RIPEMD-160, Salsa20, Scream, SEAL, SEED, Serpent,
SHA2, SHACAL-2, Shark, SHAvite3, SipHash, Skein, SMS4, Snefru,
SNOW, Square, SWIFFT, TEA, TIGER, Trivium, Twofish, VEST,
WAKE, Xenon, XTEA, XXTEA, Yamb, Zodiac
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8
Cipherunicorn-A, DECIM, FFCSR, Groestl, Haval, MAGENTA,
PANAMA, PANAMA, Phelix, Rabbit, RC2, RC6, SAFER K-128,
SAFER K-64, SC2000, Turing
16 Anubis, Keccak, SAFER+
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